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INTRODUCTION
Children understand the uncertain nature of value at an early
age. On any given street comer in America, children sit around and
hypothesize: "What would you do for a million dollars?" While the
value of the reward is finite-one million dollars-the varying lengths
to which each child will go to secure the reward demonstrate that
every child on the block values "their" million dollars differently. De-
spite the initial control that the child has over the valuation, the valua-
tion inevitably becomes more fact specific-"Do I have to eat the
whole thing orjust one bite?" or "Do I have to kiss her on the cheek or
on the lips?" After the children walk away from the game, many will
inevitably wonder, "Would I really have done that? Did I value the
million dollars correctly?"
Today, bankruptcy judges face many of the same dilemmas re-
garding valuation. When deciding on the correct value of collateral in
bankruptcy, judges do not have the benefit of an actual sale on which
to base their decision. Inevitably, these judges must enter a make-
believe world in which they hypothesize about the creditor's potential
remedies outside of bankruptcy, the debtor's potential uses of the col-
lateral, and a number of other factors. Through this process, the
bankruptcy judges must take into account the numerous choices that
creditors and debtors can make in order to receive their "million dol-
lars." Yet, the serenity of the judge's hypothetical world will often suc-
cumb to fact-specific questions-"Would the creditor in fact liquidate
the collateral?" or "Do I need to take into account the debtor's unique
use of the collateral in this case?" As a result of the divergent ap-
proaches to valuation that bankruptcy courts have taken, debtors and
creditors often have emerged from the court's valuation wondering,
"Would I really have taken those actions? Did the judge value the
collateral correctly?"
This Note discusses the three major theories for valuing secured
claims in bankruptcy reorganizations and the Supreme Court's treat-
ment of these theories in Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash (In re
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Rash).' Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Rash, three valuation
theories dominated in the courts of appeals: "wholesale valuation,"2
"replacement valuation,"3 and "midpoint valuation."'4 Although the
Rash Court prescribed replacement value as the benchmark for Chap-
ter 13 cram down valuations,5 ambiguity in the Court's definition of
replacement value has prompted some lower courts to continue to use
the midpoint value standard.6 This Note will discuss (1) how the
Court's opinion in Rash has failed to discourage courts from using
midpoint valuation, and (2) why the use of midpoint valuation makes
sense from a systems analysis standpoint.
Part I outlines the backdrop against which bankruptcy valuations
occur and explains the confusing terminology surrounding bank-
ruptcy valuation theories. Part II sets forth the statutory and ideologi-
cal underpinnings of the three valuation theories, as well as the
ruleless approach, operating at the court of appeals level prior to
Rash. Part HI examines the Supreme Court's adoption of the replace-
ment value standard in Rash, the reasoning behind the majority's deci-
sion, and Justice Stevens's dissent. Part IV discusses the lower courts'
and the National Bankruptcy Review Commission's early treatment of
Rash. This Part also analyzes the effect that courts' choices of valua-
tion standards have on debtors, creditors, and the judiciary within the
bankruptcy system. This Note concludes that the Rash decision mud-
died the valuation waters by failing to clarify the meaning of replace-
ment value and that lower courts are ignoring Rash to the extent that
it hinders judicial economy and common sense. This Note argues
that courts should instead choose a valuation system that promotes
the goals of reducing transaction costs for the parties and minimizing
strategic activity.
I
A PRIMER ON SECURED CLAIMS AND
BANKRUPTCY VALUATIONS
A. Bifurcation and Valuation in Bankruptcy
A security interest in a petitioning debtor's property entitles se-
cured creditors to two important protections in bankruptcy: (1) "ade-
quate protection" of their interest,7 and (2) payment, by the debtor,
1 117 S. Ct. 1879 (1997).
2 See infra Part H.A.
3 See infra Part II.B.
4 See infra Part 1.C.
5 See infra Part III.B.
6 See infra Part IVA
7 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (1994). Adequate protection serves to protect the secured
creditor's collateral from a decline in value during the bankruptcy. Adequate protection
issues rarely arise in Chapter 7 because of the relatively short gap between the initial filing
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totalling the value of their interest in the collateral. In Chapter 7 liq-
uidations, the secured creditor is entitled to payment of the amount
for which the trustee8 sells the collateral, 9 up to the amount of the
secured creditor's claim. 10 Thus, if the debtor owes the secured credi-
tor $100, the secured creditor submits a secured claim for $100,11 and
the trustee sells the collateral for $200, the secured creditor is entitled
to $100 of the proceeds from the sale. However, if the trustee only
receives $50 for the collateral, the secured creditor is entitled to all of
the sale's proceeds and, in addition, may file an unsecured claim for
$50.12 This splitting of the secured creditor's claim is known as bifur-
cation.13 Bifurcation simply means that a secured creditor only has a
secured claim for the value of the collateral, and the remainder of the
debt constitutes an unsecured claim. The treatment of the secured
creditor's secured claim in a Chapter 7 liquidation largely parallels
the treatment that a secured creditor's claim would receive under
state law. Outside of bankruptcy, the creditor has a right to collect
from a defaulting debtor's collateral up to the value of the debt by
repossessing and selling the debtor's collateral.' 4 The secured credi-
tor must pay the debtor any amount that it receives beyond the
amount it is owed.' 5 If the secured creditor receives less than the
amount owed by the debtor, then state law entities the secured credi-
tor to a deficiency judgment, which allows the secured creditor to col-
lect the remainder of the debt from the debtor.16 Thus, both the state
and the subsequent protection of the secured creditor's collateral. Additionally, the
debtor's immediate redemption, reaffirmation, or surrender of the collateral can quickly
render the adequate protection issue a moot point. See ELizABET WARREN &JAY LAWRENCE
WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS 339-40 (3d ed. 1996). Similarly, in
Chapter 13, the short or nonexistent time lapse between the initial filing of the petition
and the plan offering secured creditors protection greatly reduces the likelihood that ade-
quate protection issues will arise. Thus, the bulk of adequate protection issues should arise
in Chapter 11 because the extended period between the time of initial filing and the ulti-
mate confirmation of a plan increases the risk of a loss in value of the collateral.
8 In Chapter 7 cases, the court assigns a local bankruptcy trustee shortly after the
filing of the debtor's petition. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-702. The trustee bears responsibility
for collecting and liquidating the property of the estate. See id. § 704(1).
9 For more on the secured creditor's advantages and disadvantages in a trustee sale,
see LYNN M. LoPucm, STRATEGIES FOR CREDITORS IN BANKRuPTcY PROCEEDINGS 354-62 (3d
ed. 1997).
10 See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a). See generally WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 7, at 268-69
(discussing the procedures for recovering secured claims in liquidation bankruptcies).
11 See infra note 43 and accompanying text.
12 See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a).
13 For further descriptions of the operation of § 506(a) bifurcation, see David Gray
Carlson, Bifurcation of Undersecured Claims in Bankruptcy, 70 AM. BANKR. Lj. 1, 1-4 (1996);
Timothy B. McCaffrey, Jr., Comment, From Dewsnup to Nobelman to the Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1994: Did Congress Intend to Change "Pre-Amendment"Law When It Enacted § 1322(C)(2)?,
30 Loy. LA. L. REv. 841, 843-45 (1997).
14 See U.C.C. § 9-504 (1995).
15 See id. §§ 9-502(2), 9-504(2).
16 See id. § 9-502(2).
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law remedies system and Chapter 7 liquidations attach a value to the
secured creditor's collateral through an actual sale of the collateral,
whether by the secured creditor or by the bankruptcy trustee.
Chapter 11 or Chapter 13 reorganizations, however, do not value
a secured creditor's secured claim through an actual sale of the collat-
eral. Instead, the debtor has the first chance to set the collateral's
value,' 7 however the secured creditor objects to the debtor's valuation
in a majority of cases,' 8 and the bankruptcy court must then set a
value on the collateral-often at something less than the total amount
that the debtor owes.19 Valuation of the collateral can occur in a vari-
ety of situations, 20 and a court's valuation in a particular valuation pro-
ceeding may not control in different or later valuation proceedings.2'
As in Chapter 7 liquidations, § 506(a) of the Bankruptcy Code gov-
17 The debtor's plan must be filed within fifteen days of the petition date in a Chapter
13 case. See FED. R. BAN. P. 3015(b). The plan contains an initial valuation of the collat-
eral because the plan must specify the time and manner for paying secured claims. See 11
U.S.C. § 1325. Thus, the debtor must value the collateral in order to propose an appropri-
ate repayment schedule. Debtors' initial valuations often err on the low side, thereby al-
lowing more money to remain in the estate for payment of unsecured claims such as
attorneys' fees. Although some bankruptcy courts have tried to curtail these lowball "esti-
mates" through local rules dictating guidelines for initial valuations, see infra note 166 and
accompanying text, secured creditors consistently object to debtors' initial valuations. See
Robert F. Mitsch & Carleton B. Crutchfield, The Rash Decision: A Question of Value in Context,
AM. BANKR. INsT. J., July-Aug. 1997, at 18, 18. But see Jean Braucher, Getting It For You
Wholesale: Making Sense of Bankruptcy Valuations of Collateral After Rash, 102 DicK. L. REv.
(forthcoming 1998) (manuscript at 4, on file with author) (arguing that Chapter 13 debt-
ors' attorneys have an incentive to "peg value at a high and thus noncontroversial value" in
order to avoid creditor challenges that result in unprofitable litigation for the attorney).
18 A secured creditor may, upon objection to the debtor's valuation, file a motion for
a valuation hearing. See FED. R. B AKR. P. 3012. This hearing will take place prior to the
court's hearing on confirmation.
19 This undervaluation results from the secured creditor being undersecured, which
occurs when the value of the collateral is less than the amount of the total debt. Under-
secured loans are common lending practice. See, e.g., Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash
(In reRash), 90 F.3d 1036, 1053 n.22 (5th Cir. 1996) ("'Those who finance cars are typi-
cally undersecured. The debt exceeds the car's retail value.'" (quoting Association of Int'l
Auto. Mfrs., Inc. Amicus Brief at 5) (citations omitted)), rev'd 117 S. Ct 1879 (1997).
20 Contexts for application of valuation standards in the bankruptcy setting include:
relief from the automatic stay or adequate protection of collateral, see 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)
(1994); objection to proof of claim, see id. § 502; cram down and confirmation of debtor's
plan, see id. §§ 1129(b), 1325(a) (5); redemption of collateral in bankruptcy liquidations,
see id. § 722; and subordination of secured debt, see id § 364(d).
21 See Fairchild v. Lebanon Prod. Credit Ass'n (In re Fairchild), 31 B.R. 789, 795
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1983) ("A determination of the amount of a secured claim in one aspect
of a bankruptcy proceeding is not necessarily resjudicata in other aspects of that proceed-
ing."); Provident Bank v. BBT (In re BBT), 11 B.R. 224, 229 n.10 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1981)
("Of course, the value determined in the light of the purpose of vacating the automatic
stay may not be the same as the value for another purpose such as confirmation of a
plan."); see also S. REP. No. 95-989, at 68 (1978) ("[A] valuation early in the case in a
proceeding under sections 361-363 would not be binding upon the debtor or creditor at
the time of confirmation of the plan.").
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ems the valuation of secured claims in reorganizations. 22 Unlike liq-
uidations, however, in which courts value a creditor's secured claim
simply based on the trustee's sale,23 courts facing valuation proceed-
ings in Chapter 11 or Chapter 13 reorganizations must divine from
§ 506 a theory for valuing collateral without the benefit of an actual
sale. 24 This section states in relevant part:
An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property in
which the estate has an interest.., is a secured claim to the extent
of the value of such creditor's interest in the estate's interest in such
property... and is an unsecured claim to the extent that the value
of such creditor's interest ... is less than the amount of such al-
lowed claim. Such value shall be determined in light of the purpose
of the valuation and of the proposed disposition or use of such
property.
2 5
Although § 506(a) may appear to outline a concrete method for
valuation, courts facing valuation proceedings in bankruptcy reorgani-
zations have interpreted this section to support a number of conflict-
ing valuation theories, including "wholesale value, retail value, an
average between wholesale and retail value, retail replacement cost,
and the 'bid' market price."26 One court, commenting on the pub-
lished cases that have addressed the valuation question, observed that
"[t] he only thing more staggering than the sheer number of the deci-
sions is the variance among them."27 Three dominant valuation stan-
dards-the wholesale value,28 replacement value, 29 and midpoint
value 30-have emerged from § 506(a) to become the only three valua-
tion theories recognized by the courts of appeals.3 '
22 See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a).
23 See supra text accompanying notes 8-12.
24 For a case in which a court in a reorganization context preferred the value that an
actual sale demonstrated over the trustee's request for a valuation proceeding, see Romley
v. Sun Nat'l Bank (In re Two "S" Corp.), 875 F.2d 240, 244 (9th Cir. 1989) (Chapter 11)
("Evidence of other appraised values is also irrelevant, because the sale price is a better
indicator of the asset's value than any estimate of value given prior to the sale.").
25 11 U.S.C. § 506(a).
26 In re Stauffer, 141 B.R 612, 614 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1992) (citing In re Owens, 120
B.R. 487, 490 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1990)); see also 3 COLLIER ON BANunuuI'Tcy 506.04[2]
(Lawrence P. King et al. eds., 15th ed. 1996) (outlining numerous valuation theories upon
which bankruptcy courts have relied); Stinson, Mag & Fizzell, P.C., Stay Litigation After
Rash, OUR Two CENTS (visited Feb. 27, 1998) <http://www.stinson.com/2cents/rash.htm>
(discussing numerous valuation standards that courts could invoke and have invoked).
27 In re Green, 151 B.R. 501, 502 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1993).
28 See infra Part II.A.
29 See infra Part II.B.
30 See infra Part II.C.
31 See infra notes 61, 124, 164. A fourth approach to valuation given in General Motors
Acceptance Corp. v. Valenti (In re Valenti), 105 F.3d 55 (2d Cir. 1997), involves a "ruleless"
approach. See infra Part II.D. This approach does not present a fourth theory of valuation,
but merely places primacy on a court's flexibility to use any of the three approaches to
valuation depending on its merits in a particular case.
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Courts most often apply these theories in the context of valuing
motor vehicles in Chapter 13 cram downs.32 The Rash decision,33 and
the conflicting circuit court cases cited therein,3 4 all arose in the con-
text of valuing vehicles in Chapter 13 cram downs. The debtor's prin-
cipal residence is often the most important asset that the debtor owns,
and hence should be the subject of most valuation clashes. However,
the Supreme Court in Nobelman v. American Savings BankP5 held that
11 U.S.C. § 1322(b) (2) prohibits a § 506(a) bifurcation of a secured
creditor's claim in Chapter 13 when the claim is secured solely by a
security interest in the debtor's principal residence.3 6 Because this
decision only applies to a debtor's principle residence, debtors may
modify the rights of creditors who have claims secured by motor vehi-
cles without the § 1322(b) (2) restriction.3 7 As Elizabeth Warren and
Jay Lawrence Westbrook note, "[o]ne of the most common reasons
for choosing a Chapter 13 bankruptcy is the debtor's desire to keep
property that is subject to a security interest."38 Thus, most valuation
cases after Nobelman focus on the second most important asset in the
debtor's estate-the debtor's vehicle.39 While this Note's discussion
of valuation in Chapter 13 applies to all forms of collateral, in most
instances this Note will focus on the valuation of vehicles because it is
the subject of the majority of Chapter 13 valuation proceedings.
32 Cram down valuations generally arise in the context of Chapter 13 much more
often than Chapter 12 or Chapter 11. Chapter 12 applies only to family farmers and is
therefore -arely used. Chapter 11 allows a secured creditor to choose to treat the secured
creditor's entire claim as a secured claim for valuation purposes under § 1111(b), which
frequently forgoes the need to value a creditor's secured claim for bifurcation purposes.
33 Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash (In re Rash), 117 S. Ct. 1879, 1882 (1997).
Note, however, that the vehicle in Rash was not the debtor's car, used for personal reasons
and readily available for replacement in a fluid aftermarket, but instead was a Kenworth
truck, used for income-producing purposes and available for replacement in a more lim-
ited aftermarket. See id. at 1882.
34 See id. at 1883-84 (citing General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Valenti (In re Va-
lenti), 105 F.3d 55 (2d Cir. 1997); In re Hoskins, 102 F.3d 311 (7th Cir. 1996); Taffi v.
United States (In re Taffi), 96 F.3d 1190 (9th Cir. 1996); Winthrop Old Farm Nurseries,
Inc. v. New Bedford Institution for Savings (In re Winthrop), 50 F.3d 72 (1st Cir. 1995);
Metrobank v. Trimble (In re Trimble), 50 F.3d 530 (8th Cir. 1995)).
35 508 U.S. 324 (1993).
36 Id. at 328.
37 See Bank One, Chicago, NA v. Flowers (In re Flowers), 183 B.R. 509, 516 (N.D. Ill.
1995) ("Creditor's claim is secured by Debtor's car, not Debtor's principal residence, and
§ 1322(b) (2) therefore permits Debtor's Chapter 13 payment plan to modify the 'rights' of
Creditor's secured claim.").
38 WARREN & WEmBRoo, supra note 7, at 338.
39 See General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Valenti (In reValenti), 105 F.3d 55 (2d Cir.
1997); In re Hoskins, 102 F.3d 311 (7th Cir. 1996); Metrobank v. Trimble (In re Trimble),
50 F.3d 530 (8th Cir. 1995); see also HENRYJ. SOMMER, CONSUMER BANKRUPrCY LAw AND
PRACrICE 43 (Supp. 1997) ("Valuation issues arise most frequently... with respect to mo-
tor vehicles.").
1998] 1827
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
The cram down provision of Chapter 13 allows a debtor to pay
the present value of the secured creditor's claim over the life of the
debtor's plan, and thereby receive judicial confirmation of their reor-
ganization plan without the secured creditor's approval.40 Thus, in a
cram down, a debtor seeks to have the collateral valued as low as possi-
ble in order to reduce the amount of money that he must pay out to
ensure that the secured creditor receives the present value of its claim.
A creditor will seek a higher valuation of the collateral in order to
salvage as much money as possible from the bankruptcy-induced alter-
ation of the original loan contract.
A brief example will help illustrate the operation of the cram
down provision. Debtor purchases a vehicle from Secured Creditor
for $17,000, which Debtor obtains through financing 100% from Se-
cured Creditor at an interest rate of 15%.41 One year later, Debtor
defaults on his loan from Secured Creditor and shortly thereafter files
for Chapter 13. In the petition, Debtor lists ownership of the vehicle,
the $15,000 liability to Secured Creditor, and adds Secured Creditor
to the petition's list of creditors. 42 Secured Creditor then files a claim
with the bankruptcy court for $15,000, the amount that Debtor still
owes on the vehicle loan.43 Next, Debtor files a plan in which he val-
ues the vehicle at $5,000,44 and he proposes to pay Secured Creditor
$161.34 per month for thirty-six months-an amount that reflects the
$5,000, plus an interest rate of 10%. 4 5 This plan ensures that Debtor
pays Secured Creditor the present value of $5,000, as required by the
cram down provision.46 Secured Creditor may then object to Debtor's
40 See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (5) (B) (1994).
41 Alternatively, Debtor could receive the loan from a bank, a credit union, or
through an affiliate of the auto dealership. In those cases, these lending institutions would
serve as the Secured Creditor in this example.
42 Bankruptcy Rule 1007(a) (1) requires that the debtor's petition contain a list of
creditors in addition to a list of assets and liabilities. See FED. R. BAnKR. P. 1007(a) (1).
43 Although secured creditors are not required to file the proof of claim that un-
secured creditors must file in order to obligate the debtor to pay the unsecured creditor,
seeFED. R. BANKI. PROC. 3002(a), some courts have not allowed secured creditors to partici-
pate in Chapter 13 distributions without filing such proof. See, e.g., In re Wells, 125 B.R1
297, 300 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1991). For further discussion regarding the benefits and detri-
ments associated with filing a claim as a secured creditor, see LoPucra, supra note 9, at 846-
50.
44 The initial valuation, see supra note 17, often originates from the debtor's schedule
of assets and liabilities. In some jurisdictions, local rules govern the initial valuation of a
vehicle. See infra note 166 and accompanying text.
45 Bankruptcy courts require a current market rate in order to protect the present
value of the payments. For an in-depth discussion on the diverse and conflicting treatment
by courts of the interest rate question, see Hon. John K. Pearson et al., Ending the Judicial
Snipe Hunt: The Search for the Cramdown Interest Rate, 4 AM. BAnut. INsT. L. REv. 35 (1996).
46 Section 1325 ensures that "the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of property
to be distributed under the plan ... is not less than the allowed amount of [the] claim." 11
U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii) (1994). The Chapter 11 cram down provision, 11 U.S.C.
§ 1129(b) (2) (A) (i) (II), mirrors this language.
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plan, in which case the court must hold a valuation hearing separate
from,47 or in conjunction with,48 the court's hearing on the confirma-
tion of Debtor's plan. At the valuation hearing, the court will deter-
mine the value of the vehicle by choosing and applying a valuation
standard. The value that the court ascribes to the vehicle will become
the amount of Secured Creditor's secured claim, and the difference
between that amount and Secured Creditor's original $15,000 claim
will become her unsecured claim.49
As stated earlier, Debtor will seek a low value in order to reduce
the amount of money that he must pay Secured Creditor on the basis
of her secured claim, while Secured Creditor will seek a high value in
order to ensure that most, if not all, of the underlying loan becomes a
secured claim.50 Returning to the above example, assume the court
determines that the vehicle has a value of $10,000. The court will
then require Debtor to pay Secured Creditor monthly payments that
reflect the present value of $10,000. The remaining $5,000 that
Debtor owes on the outstanding loan will become an unsecured claim,
entitling Secured Creditor to payment of the unsecured claim pro rata
with the other unsecured claims. 51 Debtors may pay unsecured claims
in full, 52 may pay only a percentage of each unsecured claim,5 3 or may
not pay unsecured claims at all,54 depending on the debtors' ability to
pay. Thus, Secured Creditor is only assured of receiving $10,000 of
the original $15,000 remaining on the loan. Any further payments
47 See supra note 18.
48 Some courts have chosen to combine the valuation hearing and the confirmation
hearing. See, e.g., In re Britt, 199 B.R. 1000, 1001 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1996).
49 See supra text accompanying notes 13-14.
50 See supra text accompanying note 40.
51 This pro rata requirement for repaying unsecured creditors, which is subject to the
priority system in 11 U.S.C. § 507, is explicitly mandated in Chapter 7 by 11 U.S.C.
§ 726(a), and is inherent in the good faith requirements of Chapter 11, see 11 U.S.C.
§ 1129(a) (3), and Chapter 13, see 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (3).
52 See TERESA A. SuuvAN Er AL., As WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS 36 (1989) (reporting
that 36% of debtors submitted a plan paying 100 cents on the dollar to unsecured
creditors).
53 See, e.g., In re Ross, 162 B.R. 785 (Bankr. N.D. Il. 1993) (10% repayment); In re
Rowe, 17 B.R. 870, 871 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1982) (32% repayment); In re Armstrong, 3 B.R.
615, 616 (Bankr. D. Or. 1980) (70% repayment).
54 See, e.g., In re Fields, 190 B.R. 16 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1995) (confirming the Chapter 13
plan despite zero repayment to unsecured creditors). Prior to the addition of § 1325(b) to
the Bankruptcy Code, courts had split on the issue of whether zero-repayment plans vio-
lated § 1325(a) (3)'s "good faith" test. Compare, e.g., Downey Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Metz (In
re Metz), 820 F.2d 1495, 1497 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding that zero repayment to unsecured
creditors is not bad faith per se) with Tenney v. Terry (In re Terry), 630 F.2d 634, 635 (8th
Cir. 1980) (finding that a Chapter 13 plan must provide some repayment to unsecured
creditors in order to meet the good faith standard). In 1984 Congress added § 1325(b) to
the Bankruptcy Code, which set the minimum repayment, provided that there is an objec-
tion to the plan, at all of the debtor's "disposable income" for a three-year period or until
all of the unsecured claims are fully paid. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(b) (1994).
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hinge on Debtor's financial savvy. In order to resolve this valuation
battle between debtors and creditors, courts have focused on the dif-
fering statutory and economic arguments for the competing theories
of valuation. The remainder of this Part discusses the differingjustifi-
cations, both statutory and economic, that proponents of the three
established valuation standards have posited to justify their use.
B. Deciphering the Valuation Terminology
Courts' and commentators' tendency to use interchangeably the
various labels that describe theories of valuation necessitates a brief
explanation of the terminology that these authorities, and this Note,
use.55 This Note uses the terms "wholesale value" and "wholesale valu-
ation standard" in this background discussion to describe the particu-
lar value that creditors would realize if permitted to repossess and sell
the collateral. These terms are intended also to encompass what
courts have called "foreclosure value" or the "foreclosure value stan-
dard." Because most Chapter 13 cram down cases involve the valua-
tion of motor vehicles, courts assume that wholesale value, usually
determined by reference to a National Automobile Dealers Associa-
tion's Official Used Car Guide ("Bluebook"), 56 represents the price that
the creditor would receive for the vehicle in a foreclosure sale.57 Au-
thorities use the terms interchangeably because all of these methods
of valuation represent a single statutory interpretation of § 506(a)-
an interpretation that focuses primarily on the first sentence of the
section. 58
The terms "replacement value" and "replacement valuation stan-
dard" refer to the debtor's cost of replacing the collateral. These
terms, as used in Parts I and II of this Note, include the "retail value"
and the "retail valuation standard" terminology that courts often use.
All of these terms are intended to represent another single statutory
interpretation of § 506(a)-an interpretation that focuses primarily
on the second sentence of the section.59 When discussing these terms
55 For a further discussion of the conflation of these terms by courts, see 4 COLLIER
ON BANRuiprcy 506.03[61 [c] [iii] (Lawrence P. King et al. eds., 15th ed. 1998).
56 Future references to the "Bluebook" should be understood to indicate those indus-
try price guides that dealers, consumers, and courts use to value vehicles. See, e.g., NA-
TIONAL AuTOMOBILE DEa. aas Ass'N, OFFICIAL USED CAR GUIDE (1997).
57 Because most of the litigated cases surround the valuation of automobiles, courts
often use the wholesale Bluebook value as the benchmark for foreclosure valuations in-
stead of attempting to predict what the secured creditor would receive through a sale at an
auto auction or other foreclosure disposition. See, e.g., In re Maddox, 194 B.R. 762, 767
(Bankr. D.N.J.), affid, 200 B.R. 546, 550 (D.N.J. 1996); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Phillips (In
re Phillips), 142 B.R. 15, 17 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1992); In re Cook, 38 B.R. 870, 875 (Bankr. D.
Utah 1984).
58 See supra text accompanying note 25.
59 See supra text accompanying note 25.
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in light of the Rash case, however, it becomes problematic to consoli-
date them because Rash specifically distinguishes retail value, which
often contains costs that the debtor would not incur if he retained the
vehicle, and replacement value, which does not contain dealer costs. 60
Thus, this Note must parse the differences between foreclosure value,
wholesale value, replacement value, and retail value when discussing
the Rash opinion and its subsequent treatment by the lower courts.
II
FouR APPROACHES TO VALUING SECURED CLAIMS
IN BANKRupTcy
A. The Wholesale Valuation Standard
Two circuits,61 numerous bankruptcy courts,62 and several com-
mentators63 adopted the wholesale valuation standard in bankruptcy
reorganizations prior to Rash. Absent specific evidence that the se-
cured creditor will receive the full retail value upon disposition of the
collateral, the wholesale valuation standard fixes the collateral's value
at the amount that the secured creditor could realize upon disposition
of the collateral in a commercially reasonable foreclosure.64 For vehi-
cles, some courts use the wholesale price, given in the Bluebook, as
the benchmark for valuation. 65 These courts choose the wholesale
60 See infra Part III.B.
61 SeeAssociates Commercial Corp. v. Rash (In re Rash), 90 F.3d 1036 (5th Cir. 1996),
rev d, 117 S. Ct. 1879 (1997); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Mitchell (In reMitchell),
954 F.2d 557 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled by Taffi v. United States (In reTaffi), 96 F.3d 1190,
1193 (9th Cir. 1996).
62 See, e.g., In re Maddox, 194 B.R. 762, 767 (Bankr. D.NJ.), affd, 200 B.R. 546, 550
(D.N.J. 1996); In re Ferguson, 149 B.R. 625, 626 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1993); In re Rossow, 147
B.R. 1, 3 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1992); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Phillips (In rePhillips), 142 B.R.
15, 17 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1992); In re Owens, 120 B.R. 487, 490 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1990); In re
Cook, 38 B.R. 870, 875 (Bankr. D. Utah 1984).
63 See Owen W. Katz, Valuation of Secured Claims in a Bankruptcy Reorganization: Eating
with the Hounds and Running with the Hares, 100 COM. L.J. 320, 322 (1995) ("The valuation
of a secured claim for purposes of a reorganization plan under a commercially reasonable
disposition standard ... is more consistent with other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code
and ... the more defensible result."); James F. Queenan, Jr., Standards for Valuation of
Security Interests in Chapter 11, 92 COM. LJ. 18, 20 (1987) ("[T]he selection of a standard for
valuation of security and mortgage interests in Chapter 11 should be based upon an analy-
sis of the rights and obligations of the secured creditor at foreclosure.. .
64 See In re Byington, 197 B.R. 130, 134 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1996).
65 An interesting question arises when the secured creditor enters into a recourse
agreement with the retail dealer who sold it the car. Recourse agreements will often re-
quire the dealer to reimburse the secured creditor for the full, unpaid contract price
should the secured creditor be required to repossess the vehicle. See Michael W. Dunagan,
Repossession Issues, DeficiencyJudgnents and Bankruptcy Considerations for Sub-Prime Auto Lend-
ers, 49 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 384, 385 (1995). However, the majority of cases have
refused to recognize the secured creditor's recourse remedy as a commercially reasonable
"sale"; instead, they have completely ignored the agreement for valuation purposes. See,
e.g., Grubbs v. National Bank of S.C. (In re Grubbs), 114 B.R. 450, 452 (D.S.C. 1990); In re
1998] 1831
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
price because the secured creditor will usually dispose of the vehicle
in a commercially reasonable foreclosure "by selling it to a dealer or
by sending it to a vehicle auction."66 Although the legislative history
of § 506 suggests that courts should use neither wholesale nor replace-
ment value standards exclusively, 67 courts have agreed that within the
context of valuing secured claims in Chapter 13 cram downs, a single
rule of law is necessary. 68 Proponents of wholesale valuation have sev-
eral compelling statutory and economic arguments for adopting their
standard.
1. Statutory Analysis
Champions of wholesale value emphasize the importance of the
first sentence of § 506, specifically the phrase "the value of such credi-
tor's interest in the estate's interest in such property."69 In Associates
Commercial Corp. v. Rash (In re Rash),70 the Fifth Circuit applied a two-
step analysis in interpreting this phrase. First, the court determined
that this phrase requires judges to examine the estate's interest-the
rights that the debtor has in the collateral.71 If the debtor has only a
part ownership interest, or if the interest is a junior or subordinated
lien, then the creditor's interest is necessarily limited, for the creditor
cannot take a security interest in property in which the debtor initially
Cook, 38 B.R. 870, 875 (Bankr. D. Utah 1984); In re Klein, 20 B.R. 493, 495 (Bankr. N.D.
Ill. 1982); In re Beranek, 9 B.R. 864, 865 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1981); Chrysler Credit Corp. v.
Van Nort (In re Van Nort), 9 B.R. 218, 221 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1981). But see In re Stumbo,
7 B.R. 939, 940 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1981) (valuing the vehicle at the amount that the secured
creditor would receive as a result of a recourse agreement with the dealership); cf. Lomas
Mortgage USA v. Wiese (In reWiese), 980 F.2d 1279, 1283 (9th Cir. 1992) (distinguishing
another case on the ground that "it did not involve... 'any type of recourse agreement
that would guarantee the creditor more than market value'" (quoting In re Fischer, 136
B.R. 819, 827 (Bankr. D. Alaska 1992)).
66 Byington, 197 B.R. at 134.
67 The House Report states: "'Value' does not necessarily contemplate forced sale or
liquidation value of the collateral; nor does it always imply a full going concern value.
Courts will have to determine value on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the facts of
each case . . . ." H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 356 (1977); see also S. REP. No. 95-989, at 68
(1978) ("While courts will have to determine value on a case-by-case basis ... valuation is to
be determined in light of the purpose of the valuation and the proposed disposition or use
of the subject property.").
68 See infra text accompanying notes 221-23.
69 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1994).
70 Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash (In re Rash), 90 F.3d 1036, 1043-44 (5th Cir.
1996), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 1879 (1997). This case is one of two cases decided at the court of
appeals level that has approved of foreclosure valuation. This case, heard en banc by the
Fifth Circuit and decided by a 9-6 vote, reversed an earlier decision by a panel of Fifth
Circuitjudges in Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash (In reRash), 31 F.3d 325 (5th Cir. 1994),
modified, 62 F.3d 685 (5th Cir. 1995). The other case, General Motors Acceptance Corp. v.
Mitchell (In re Mitchell), 954 F.2d 557 (9th Cir. 1992), was recently overruled by the Ninth
Circuit in Taffi v. United States (In re Taffi), 96 F.3d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir. 1996).
71 See Rash, 90 F.3d at 1043.
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had no right.72 Courts uniformly agree that the initial determination
of the debtor's interest in the collateral is the first step in valuing that
collateral. 73
Second, the Fifth Circuit looked to the value of the creditor's in-
terest.74 According to the court: "[The] valuation . . . must account
for the fact that the creditor's interest is in the nature of a security
interest, giving the creditor the ight to repossess and sell the collat-
eral and nothing more. Therefore, the valuation should start with
what the creditor could realize by exercising that right."75
Other courts cite the Supreme Court's decision in United Savings
Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates76 to support using the credi-
tor's interest as the starting point for the second step of the valuation
process.77 In Timbers, the Court (in dicta) defined the value of the
creditor's interest as "the value of the collateral."78 According to this
view, courts should value collateral as if it was in the creditor's hands.
Because secured creditors typically dispose of collateral on the whole-
sale market, wholesale value is the logical choice for valuing collateral
under this approach.
However, courts that have used the wholesale valuation standard
encountered trouble reconciling the second sentence of § 506 (a) with
the first. The second sentence of § 506(a) focuses on the "proposed
disposition or use" of the collateral. 79 In Chapter 13, the debtor re-
tains and continues to use the collateral.80 Wholesale value thus ap-
pears to ignore the debtor's use of the collateral, for debtors likely
would have to pay retail value to replace the collateral if they were
72 See id.
73 See, e.g., id.; see also Taffi v. United States (In re Taffi), 96 F.3d 1190, 1192 (9th Cir.
1996) (describing the estate's interest in the collateral before proceeding to value the col-
lateral); In re Gabor, 155 B.R. 391, 393-94 (Bankr. N.D. W. Va. 1993) (finding that the
estate had no interest in the collateral because of debtor's prepefition transfer).
74 See Rash, 90 F.3d at 1044.
75 Id.; see also In reRaylin Dev. Co., 110 B.R. 259, 261 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1989) ("Valua-
tion must be approached in large part from the point of view of what the collateral would
be worth in the hands of the creditor.... ."); In re Boring, 91 B.RL 791, 795 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio
1988) ("[I]t is the creditor's interest in property which should be valued under § 506, not
the value, per se, of the property itself.").
76 484 U.S. 365 (1988).
77 See Rash, 90 F.3d 1036, 1043 (5th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 1879 (1997); In re
Maddox, 194 B.R. 762, 768 (Bankr. D.N.J.), affd, 200 B.R. 546 (D.N.J. 1996); General
Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Mitchell (In re Mitchell), 954 F.2d 557, 560 (9th Cir. 1992),
overruled by Taffi, 96 F.3d at 1193;.
78 Timbers, 484 U.S. at 372.
79 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1994).
80 As outlined in § 1306(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, the debtor in a Chapter 13 case
"shall remain in possession of all property of the estate." 11 U.S.C. § 1306(b). The Bank-
ruptcy Code defines property of the estate in § 541. See 11 U.S.C. § 541. Property, as de-
fined, does include motor vehicles in which the debtor has a "legal or equitable interest."
11 U.S.C. § 541 (a) (1).
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deprived of its use. In Rash, the Fifth Circuit skirted this issue by rely-
ing on its prior determination that "such value"-the language found
in the second sentence of § 506-refers only to the creditor's interest
in the collateral. 8 ' The majority of courts adopting wholesale valua-
tion have limited the application of the "disposition or use" language
to situations in which "'the manner of that [use] is so unusual or ex-
treme as to constitute a use that is destructive of the collateral itself in
a way unanticipated."'8 2 Examples of such use include "a proposal to
use a combine for custom work" when the debtor previously had used
it "seasonally to harvest his [own] crop,"8' 3 and when the debtor uses
the collateral twenty-four hours per day and causes rapid deprecia-
tion.8 4 When the debtor uses the collateral in an unusual or extreme
manner, the value of the creditor's security interest changes in ways
that the secured creditor did not anticipate. However, when the
debtor uses the collateral "for its usual, intended purpose, such reten-
tion and use should not ordinarily affect a valuation" because the
creditor's interest has not changed appreciably.85 Thus, proponents
of wholesale valuation privilege their already determined valuation of
the creditor's interest over the statute's "disposition or use" language.
Courts reconcile the "purpose of the valuation" language in the
second sentence of § 506(a) with the wholesale valuation standard by
examining the purpose and operation of the cram down provisions.8 6
Debtors who wish to retain property encumbered with a security inter-
est in Chapter 13 have three options: (1) propose a system of payment
for the collateral, to which the secured creditor must consent in order
for the plan to gain approval;8 7 (2) pay the creditor the present value
of the secured claim, as determined by the bankruptcy court;88 or (3)
surrender the collateral to the secured creditor.89 Because the cram
down provision gives debtors the option of surrendering the collateral
when the secured creditor refuses their proposed payment, courts es-
pousing wholesale value state that the application of replacement
value would undermine the purpose of a cram down. As the Bank-
ruptcy Court for the District of Kansas explains:
[T] he only purpose to determine the value of a vehicle in a Chapter
13 case "is to establish the amount of the creditor's secured claim in
81 Rash, 90 F.3d at 1047-48.
82 Id. at 1049 (quoting In re Claeys, 81 B.R. 985, 992 (Bankr D.N.D. 1987)).
83 Claeys, 81 B.R. at 992.
84 See Queenan, supra note 63, at 37.
85 Rash, 90 F.3d at 1050.
86 See, e.g., In reByington, 197 B.R. 130, 136 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1996); In reMaddox, 194
B.Rt 762, 767-68 (Bankr. D.N.J.), affid, 200 B.R. 546 (D.NJ. 1996).
87 See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (5) (A) (1994).
88 See id. § 1325(a) (5) (B).
89 See id. § 1325(a) (5) (C).
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order to permit a debtor to retain and use the property... in ac-
cordance with § 1325 (a) (5) (B)." Otherwise, the debtor would sim-
ply surrender the property to the creditor, § 1325 (a) (5) (C) would
be satisfied, and any impediment to confirmation of the debtor's
Chapter 13 plan... would be removed.90
The court in In re Maddox° l observed that the cram down and surren-
der options are available "as equivalent methods of protecting the se-
cured creditor's interest."92 Consequently, valuations in the cram
down context should approximate what the creditor would receive in
a commercially reasonable sale-the likely result when the debtor sur-
renders the collateral.93 Thus, in order to preserve the "purpose of
the valuation"-the debtor's use of the cram down provision-many
courts agree that § 506(a) dictates the adoption of wholesale value.
2. Economic Analysis
Proponents of both wholesale and replacement valuations main-
tain that the application of the opposing standard creates a windfall
for an undeserving party. Proponents of wholesale valuation believe
that replacement valuation creates a windfall for the secured credi-
tors,9 4 while proponents of replacement valuation argue that whole-
sale valuation creates a windfall for the unsecured creditors, who take
the extra disposable income which has accrued to the debtor.95
The Fifth Circuit in Rash argued that § 506 protects the secured
creditor in a cram down because it requires payments under the
debtor's plan to equal the amount of the secured creditor's allowed
secured claim, plus a market rate of interest, which allows the creditor
to receive a "'value of not less than would be received in an immedi-
ate liquidation.' 96 Instead of courts granting secured creditors the
substantial additional protection of replacement value-a result the
Rash court chides as 'Judicial legislation . . . [in which courts] ir-
90 Byington, 197 B.R. at 136 (quoting In re Myers, 178 B.R. 518, 523 (Bankr. W.D. Okla.
1995)).
91 194 B.R 762 (Bankr. D.NJ.), aff'd 200 B.R. 546 (D.Nj. 1996).
92 Id. at 768.
93 See id.
94 See, e.g., Valley Nat'l Bank v. Malody (In re Malody), 102 B.R. 745, 750 (BAP. 9th
Cir. 1989) (stating that an award of retail value affords the creditor a premium).
95 See, e.g., Winthrop Old Farm Nurseries, Inc. v. New Bedord Inst. for Say. (In re
Winthrop Old Farm Nurseries, Inc.), 50 F.3d 72, 76 (1st Cir. 1995) (explaining that fore-
closure value "allow[s] a reorganizing debtor to reap a windfall"). For a discussion of how
proponents of replacement valuation view the debtor's windfall, see infra text accompany-
ing notes 149-51. For further discussion on how the debtor may manipulate this windfall,
see infra text accompanying notes 385-90.
96 Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash (In re Rash), 90 F.3d 1036, 1053 (5th Cir.
1996) (quoting In re Myers, 178 B.R. 518, 523 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1995)), reu'4, 117 S. Ct.
1879 (1997).
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pos [el their view of appropriate bankruptcy policy upon litigants" 97-
the Fifth Circuit placed the onus of procuring additional protection
on the secured creditors themselves.98 According to the court,
"' [1] enders and sellers build the risk of... bankruptcy into the inter-
est rates they charge, the prices at which they sell, and the transaction
costs that they charge.' Creditors can also protect themselves by re-
quiring a larger down payment or shortening the term of the loan."99
The court maintained that awarding replacement value created a
windfall for the secured creditor who otherwise would have to fore-
close under state law provisions.'00 As the majority in Rash recog-
nized, awarding replacement value places the creditor in the same
position as a retail dealer, "even where the creditor is not a dealer and
could not realize such value under any other circumstances."' 0 1
The secured creditor realizes this windfall at the expense of the
pool of unsecured creditors who, by virtue of the secured creditor's
increased claim, lose the payout on a proportionate amount of their
claims. 10 2 This result occurs even though a secured creditor, to the
extent that he is undersecured, has in effect made an unsecured loan
and thus arguably should share pro rata with the other unsecured
creditors.' 03 Although it may appear that the debtor would be ambiv-
alent about the proportion of money allotted to secured and un-
secured creditors, the Fifth Circuit recognized that this allotment
might determine whether a court will confirm the debtor's plan. 10 4
The majority in Rash reasoned that if courts awarded replacement
value, some bankruptcies might not be confirmed because the shift in
assets from unsecured creditors to secured creditors, combined with a
possible lack of adequate funds in the plan to compensate secured
97 Id. (quoting In re Myers, 178 B.R. 518, 523 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1995)).
98 See id.
99 Id. (quoting KarrH M. LUNDIN, CHAPTER 13 BANKRuPTcy § 5.48, at 5-134 (2d ed.
1994 & Supp. 1995)) (citation omitted).
1o0 See id. at 1054.
101 Id.; see also In relByington, 197 B.R. 130, 136 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1996) ("A fundamental
problem with a retail standard is that it implicitly includes a profit for the creditor on the
'sale' of its collateral to the debtor."). However, in Rash the creditor did not present evi-
dence that he was in a position to sell the collateral for a price greater than wholesale.
Most courts using foreclosure value will allow creditors to prove that they could receive a
greater price than the wholesale value at a foreclosure sale. See, e.g., Byington, 197 B.R. at
136 (stating that the presumption of foreclosure value "can be overcome by specific evi-
dence demonstrating a creditor's usual method of selling").
102 This occurs because of the system of priority at work in Chapter 13, in which se-
cured creditors are guaranteed payment of their secured claim by operation of the cram
down provisions, see 11 U.S.C. § 1325 (a) (5) (B) (ii) (1994), while unsecured creditors are
entitled only to what they would receive in a Chapter 7 liquidation, see 11 U.S.C.
§ 1325(a) (4).
103 See Rash, 90 F.3d at 1053 n.22.
104 See id. at 1055 n.25.
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creditors, could violate the "good faith" requirement of § 1325.105 In
such a case, the court would convert the plan to a Chapter 7 liquida-
tion, and the secured creditor would be forced to foreclose, most
likely receiving wholesale value as a result. 10 6
The wholesale valuation standard focuses on those actions that
the debtor and a secured creditor would have taken in the "real
world" outside of bankruptcy, ignoring the role of the unsecured
creditor in both the real world and in Chapter 13. Outside of bank-
ruptcy, unsecured creditors would have recourse against the secured
creditor's collateral to the extent that the collateral's value exceeded
the secured creditor's loan.10 7 Thus, allocating the windfall-the dif-
ference between the amount the secured creditor would have re-
ceived in a state law foreclosure and the replacement value of the
collateral-to the secured creditor ignores the fact that, outside of
bankruptcy, the unsecured creditors may not lose this value because
of their ability to force a sale of the collateral when its value exceeds
the value the secured creditor would receive upon foreclosure. 08
Furthermore, to the extent that bankruptcy bifurcates the secured
creditor's claim into secured and unsecured portions, 10 9 apportion-
ment of the windfall is not a zero-sum game from the secured credi-
tor's standpoint. The secured creditor will still benefit, albeit not as
directly, from an increase in the amount that the unsecured creditors
will receive. 10
Supporters of the wholesale value standard also point to Con-
gress's intent to prevent secured creditors from taking "hostage value"
105 See id. at 1055 n.24. But see supra note 54 and accompanying text. For an outline of
the good faith requirement, see 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a) (3).
106 See Rash, 90 F.3d at 1055 n.24.
107 Unsecured creditors may proceed against an oversecured creditor's collateral by
winning ajudgment against the debtor, obtaining a writ of execution, and obtaining a lien
by levying on the debtor's property. See LvN M. LoPucmi & EuzABETH WARREN, SECURED
CREDrr. A SYSTEMS APPROACH 5-14 (1995) (using Vitale v. Hotel California, Inc., 446 A.2d 880
(NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1982) to describe the process by which unsecured creditors be-
come judgment lien holders). Unsecured creditors can obtain judgment and levy on the
debtor's property even when this property is subject to a security interest. See LoPuciu &
WARREN, supra, at 563-87 (describing the priority system between secured creditors and
judgment lienors). Although Article 9 allows unsecured creditors to seek repayment in
this manner, the realities of debtors' and secured creditors' strategic activity may discour-
age unsecured creditors from seeking any legal remedy in this situation. See Lynn M.
LoPucki, Legal Culture, Legal Strategy, and the Law in Lawyers'Heads, 90 Nw. U. L. REv. 1498,
1537 (1996).
108 For more on the relevance of unsecured creditors to the valuation picture, see
Katz, supra note 63.
109 See supra text accompanying notes 8-14.
110 This result assumes that an increase of money in the estate will be distributed to the
general unsecured creditors. The possibility of a zero-percentage payout to general un-
secured creditors, see supra note 54, and the priority system among unsecured creditors, see
11 U.S.C. § 507, are two obstacles to this result.
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in consumer goods."' During the late 1970s, when Congress was con-
templating changes to Chapter 13, some secured creditors began tak-
ing security interests in all of the debtors' household goods and
personal items. 112 Although such items had a negligible resale value,
their sentimental and replacement value to the debtor placed great
pressure on the debtor to repay the debt. The House Report indicates
that Congress intended for § 506 to alleviate this coercive pressure by
"requir[ing] the court to value the secured creditor's interest."'113 As
one court favoring wholesale value observed, "[a] rule requiring valua-
tions ... to measure the replacement cost of collateral to the debtors
would defeat the design of Congress by giving secured creditors lever-
age they were not meant to have." 114
Judge Easterbrook's concurrence in In re Hoskins15 elaborates on
the argument that courts should look to state law when deciding how
to treat the secured creditor's claim. 116 Easterbrook maintained that
without an explicit congressional mandate for choosing a particular
valuation standard, like the kind that the Bankruptcy Code gives for
home mortgages in § 1322(b) (2), 117 courts should interpret § 506(a)
by looking at what recourse the secured creditor would have under
state law outside of bankruptcy. 1 8 In the case of personal property,
the secured creditor's recourse is the amount that it could realize
from an Article 9 sale. For example, in the case of a vehicle, the se-
cured creditor would realize wholesale value. 119 Even if the vehicle
was worth more to the debtor than its wholesale value, Easterbrook
hypothesized that the debtor only would have to pay a negligible
amount over wholesale value to procure the car at an auction. 120 He
reasons first that no dealer would pay over wholesale because "by hy-
pothesis, dealers can get equivalent cars for [wholesale] ."121 He then
notes that the secured creditor would also be unwilling to pay more
than wholesale value, for to do so would reduce a possible deficiency
111 See, e.g., Rash, 90 F.3d at 1056; Grubbs v. Houston First Am. Say. Ass'n, 730 F.2d
236, 239 & n.3 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc); In re Cook, 38 B.R. 870, 874 (Bankr. D. Utah
1984).
112 See H.R. RFP. No. 95-595, at 124 (1977).
113 Id.
114 In re Cook, 38 B.R. at 874.
115 102 F.3d 311, 317 (7th Cir. 1996). For a discussion of the majority opinion in
Hoskins, see infra Part II.C.
116 See id. at 318 (Easterbrook, J., concurring).
117 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b) (2) (1994); see also supra text accompanying note 36 (discussing
the Nobelman decision).
118 Hoskins, 102 F.3d at 318 (Easterbrook, J., concurring).
119 Id. at 320 (Easterbrook, J., concurring); see also supra text accompanying notes 15-
16 (discussing state law foreclosure methods for vehicles).
120 See Hoskins, 102 F.3d at 320 (Easterbrook, J., concurring).
121 Id. (Easterbrook, J., concurring).
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judgment without getting any value in return.1 22 Thus, according to
Easterbrook, charging the debtor for the replacement value of the col-
lateral does not accurately reflect the result that would occur outside
of bankruptcy. 23
B. The Replacement Valuation Standard
Prior to the Supreme Court's Rash decision, most circuits favored
replacement valuation, 124 and numerous bankruptcy courts125 and
commentators followed their lead.' 26 Replacement value measures
the debtor's cost of replacing the collateral, as opposed to the amount
the creditor would receive from the sale of the collateral. 127 Propo-
nents of replacement valuation find support for their position in the
Bankruptcy Code' 28 and in an economic evaluation of the effects of
awarding replacement value on debtors and secured creditors.129
Although secured creditors have lobbied Congress to codify the re-
placement valuation standard in order to avoid the judicial debate al-
together, they have not met with any success thus far.'3 0
1. Statutory Analysis
Courts and commentators justify the replacement valuation stan-
dard by emphasizing the second sentence of § 506(a), which states
that "value shall be determined in light of the purpose of the valua-
122 See id. at 320 (Easterbrook, J., concurring).
123 See id. (Easterbrook, J., concurring). Easterbrook's hypothesized sale contains
many questionable assumptions, not the least of which is the availability and accessibility of
a deficiency judgment from the debtor. See LoPuc i & WARREN, supra note 107, at 83-85
(discussing the proliferation of antideficiency statutes). If Easterbrook truly wanted Chap-
ter 13 cram down valuations to mirror state law entitlements, he should have argued for
extinguishing the secured creditor's unsecured claim completely, thus mirroring the effect
of state antideficiency statutes.
124 See Metrobank v. Trimble (In re Trimble), 50 F.3d 530, 532 (8th Cir. 1995); Win-
throp Old Farm Nurseries, Inc. v. New Bedford Inst. for Say. (In re Winthrop Old Farm
Nurseries, Inc.), 50 F.3d 72, 75 (1st Cir. 1995) (Chapter 11); cf Huntington Nat'l Bank v.
Pees (In re McClurkin), 31 F.3d 401, 405 (6th Cir. 1994) (concluding that hypothetical
costs of sale should not be deducted because property is not being disposed); Coker v.
Sovran Equity Mortgage Corp. (In re Coker), 973 F.2d 258, 260 (4th Cir. 1992) (same).
125 See, e.g., In re Dews, 191 B.R. 86, 91 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1995); In re Coates, 180 B.R.
110, 117 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1995); Arnette v. General Motors Acceptance Corp. (In re
Arnette), 156 B.R. 366, 368 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1993); In re Green, 151 B.RI 501, 506 (Bankr.
D. Minn. 1993); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Johnson (In reJohnson), 145 B.R.
108 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1992), rev'd 165 B.R 524 (S.D. Ga. 1994).
126 See, e.g., The Valuation Debate, Am. BANm. INsT. J., Nov. 1996, at 1 (comments of
Richardo I. Kilpatrick); Mary Davies Scott & Kimberly Forseth Woodyard, Issues Affecting
Consumer Lenders, in SA80 A.L.I.-A.B.AL 31, 123-24 (1996)
127 See infra note 357.
128 See infra Part II.B.1.
129 See infra Part II.B.2.
130 See infra Part IV.B.
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tion and of the proposed disposition or use of [the] property."'131
Although replacement and wholesale theorists agree that the phrase,
"in light of the purpose of the valuation," means that value may differ
depending on the valuation setting, 3 2 the two sides differ sharply on
the purpose of valuing secured claims in Chapter 13. In the Fifth Cir-
cuit's Rash decision, the dissent stated that the purpose of valuing a
secured creditor's claim in Chapter 13 "is to determine the value of
property retained by a debtor, not sold by a creditor."'' 33 Looking at
the "proposed disposition or use" of the property, the dissent opined:
"[(S] ince the Debtor's Plan provides for it to retain the Property, the
value of Bank's interest in the Debtor's interest in the Property
should be determined without regard for the hypothetical costs that
may be incurred by Bank if it gets the Property back. Why? Because
it is not getting the Property back."134
In contrast to the Rash majority's limited application of "use" to those
situations in which the debtor contemplates particularly harmful uses
of the collateral,135 the dissent stated "that disposition or use is rele-
vant in every case.' 3 6 The dissent criticized the majority's restrictive
reading of the first sentence of § 506(a), maintained that the major-
ity's approach rendered the last sentence of § 506(a) surplusage, and
stated that the opinion "'virtually ignor[es] the debtor's proposed dis-
position of the collateral and the requirements of the second sentence
of § 506(a).""'13 7
Ironically, advocates of both wholesale and replacement valua-
tion have found support for their statutory interpretation in the
Supreme Court's Timbers decision. 38 Responding to wholesale valua-
tion proponent's isolation of the term "creditor's interest," courts
favoring the replacement standard have cited Justice Scalia's opinion
in Timbers to support favorably the proposition that the creditor's in-
terest is not merely the equivalent of foreclosure rights. 139 Construing
131 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1994).
132 See supra text accompanying notes 20-21. But see NATIONAL BANum. REv. COMM'N,
BANu'uurrc- THE NEXT Tw mYYEARs 248 (1997) (questioning the need for different valu-
ation standards in different settings).
133 Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash (In re Rash), 90 F.3d 1036, 1066 (5th Cir.
1996) (Smith, J., dissenting), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 1789 (1997).
134 Id. (Smith, J., dissenting) (quoting In re Spacek, 112 B.R. 162, 164 (Bankr. W.D.
Tex. 1990) (alteration in original)).
135 See supra text accompanying notes 82-85.
136 Rash, 90 F.3d at 1067 (Smith, J., dissenting).
137 Id. at 1068 (Smith,J, dissenting) (quoting Brown & Co. Sec. Corp. v. Balbus (In re
Balbus), 933 F.2d 246, 251 (4th Cir. 1991)).
138 484 U.S. 365 (1988). See supra text accompanying notes 76-78 for a discussion of
foreclosure valuation and Timbers.
139 See, e.g., Sandy Ridge Dev. Corp. v. Louisiana Nat'l Bank (In re Sandy Ridge Dev.
Corp.), 881 F.2d 1346, 1349 (5th Cir. 1989).
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the adequate protection requirement of the Bankruptcy Code,140
Scalia stated that "[t] he term 'interest in property' certainly summons
up such concepts as 'fee ownership,' 'life estate,' 'co-ownership,' and
'security interest' more readily than it does the notion of 'right to im-
mediate foreclosure. '""41 While wholesale value theorists derive a nar-
row and limited definition of "creditor's interest" from the first
sentence of § 506(a), courts favoring the replacement standard argue
that the purpose of the first sentence is deceptively simple: "[i]n situa-
tions involving only one creditor and one debtor, the value of the un-
dersecured creditor's secured claim is simply the value of the
underlying collateral."142
Additionally, those Supreme Court decisions that interpret the
Bankruptcy Code as protecting secured creditors at the expense of
unsecured creditors appear to support the application of the replace-
ment value standard. The Fifth Circuit's dissent in Rash looked to two
Supreme Court decisions-Nobelman v. American Savings Bank143 and
United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc.144-to support this preference
for secured creditors. The Nobelman Court interpreted Chapter 13's
cram down provision to prevent debtors from bifurcating home mort-
gages, thereby reducing the value of the mortgagee's collateral in
bankruptcy. 45 In Ron Pair, the Court held that § 506(b) entitled over-
secured creditors to interest and costs up to the amount of their extra
security in addition to the prepetition amount of their claim. 146 The
dissent in Rash reasoned that both of these decisions show the Court's
desire to protect secured creditors at the expense of not only the un-
secured creditors but also, quite often, the debtor.147
2. Economic Analysis
Replacement valuation's proponents identify several economic
reasons for adopting this valuation method. In the Fifth Circuit, the
Rash dissent asserted that under Chapter 13, the "creditor's rights of
foreclosure, sale, bidding-in and the like are not being delayed; rather
they are being extinguished and replaced forever . . . with lesser
140 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (1) (1994).
141 Timbers, 484 U.S. at 371.
142 Sandy Ridge 881 F.2d at 1349.
143 508 U.S. 324 (1993) (interpreting § 1322(b) (2) to prohibit debtors from using
§ 506(a) to cram down mortgages on the debtor's principal residence).
144 489 U.S. 235 (1989).
145 See supra text accompanying notes 36-37.
146 See Ron Pair, 489 U.S. at 239-40.
147 See Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash (In reRash), 90 F.3d 1036, 1072 n.15 (5th
Cir. 1996) (Smith, J., dissenting), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 1789 (1997).
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rights. 1 48 Thus, the focus should be on the amount the creditor
needs to compensate it for the loss of these rights.
Proponents also argue that replacement valuation properly
awards the "bonus" that successful reorganization creates-the
amount over and above what the secured creditor would have realized
either in a Chapter 7 liquidation or under state law remedies-to se-
cured creditors, because the success of the debtor's plan often turns
on the debtor's retention of the secured creditor's collateral. 149
Courts favoring replacement valuation also reason that awarding this
windfall from successful reorganization to the secured creditor com-
pensates the creditor for the risk it assumed-the debtor's reorganiza-
tion could have failed, which could have caused the collateral to
depreciate. Such a failure would force the creditor to incur the de-
preciation costs that it otherwise could have avoided by immediate
liquidation in Chapter 7 or under state law. 150 Proponents of replace-
ment valuation view the other option-giving the windfall to the
debtor or to the estate-as creating incentives for debtors to strip the
secured creditor's lien and either sell the collateral for its full market
value or destroy it for insurance proceeds.15 1
Replacement valuation advocates also argue that even if the
"creditor's interest" is the correct measure of value under § 506(a),
courts still may value that interest incorrectly when calculating the
amount the secured creditor would realize in a commercially reason-
able sale. They feel that proponents of wholesale valuation ignore two
major components of value when performing this calculation: (1) the
secured creditor's right to bid-in at a foreclosure; and (2) the value of
the secured creditor's leverage vis-4-vis the debtor.152 Outside of
148 Id. at 1074 (Smith, J., dissenting) (quoting In re Freudenheim, 189 B.R 279, 280
(Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1995)).
149 See id. at 1072 (Smith, J., dissenting). At one point the majority in Rash poked fun
at this notion by pointing out that the dissent's desire to compensate the secured creditor
for allowing the debtor to retain the collateral would force courts "to calculate the 'surplus'
generated by the debtor's retention of a recliner that he sat in after returning home from
an eight-hour shift at a factory." Id. at 1052 n.21. The majority thought that such a reward
should be reserved for secured lenders in Chapter 11 reorganizations in which the lender
has a security interest in the majority of the business, thereby assuming responsibility for
the surplus that the estate creates. See id. at 1053 n.23. While this argument may appear
convincing on the surface, this reasoning ignores the fact that the collateral usually at issue
is the debtor's car, which is often the debtor's means of transportation to work. The car is
thus responsible for the subsequent creation of the debtor's wages, which create the sur-
plus in Chapter 13. For instance, in the Rash, the collateral was the debtor's truck used in
his work, and it thereby constituted an important income-producing asset. See id. at 1039.
150 See id. at 1066 (Smith, J., dissenting); see also Taffi v. United States (In re Taffi), 96
F.3d 1190, 1192-93 (9th Cir. 1996) ("By agreeing to the Plan and allowing the [debtors] to
retain their [collateral], the [creditor] runs a risk. It is appropriate that it also benefit
from the higher valuation.").
151 See Rash, 90 F.3d at 1073 (Smith, J., dissenting).
152 See In re Freudenheim, 189 B.R 279, 281 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1995).
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bankruptcy, secured creditors have the right to bid-in at the foreclo-
sure sale up to the amount of their debt.153 At such a sale, the secured
creditor typically buys the collateral at wholesale value and then resells
it to a buyer in the market, thereby yielding an amount close to the
retail value of the collateral.154 Supporters of replacement valuation
argue that wholesale valuation fails to compensate secured creditors
for the loss of the right to bid-in, and thus, replacement valuation
more closely approximates, in most instances, what would happen in
the real world. 155 Replacement valuation proponents garner further
support from the language of the Supreme Court's decision in Dew-
snup v. Timm.156 In Dewsnup, the Court interpreted § 506(d) and
stated: "The creditor's lien stays with the real property[;] ... any in-
crease over the judicially determined valuation... rightly accrues to
the benefit of the creditor, not to the benefit of the debtor and not to
the benefit of other unsecured creditors.., who had nothing to do
with the mortgagor-mortgagee bargain.' 5 7 Some courts have con-
strued this language to "lay to rest any contention that the opportu-
nity... to bid-in ... [is] not [an] element[ ] of value that should
command a difference in treatment of a creditor whose collateral...
will be retained and operated by the Debtor."' 58 Thus, the proper
valuation standard should take into account the value of the secured
creditor's bid-in rights.
153 See LoPucxi & WARREN, supra note 107, at 85-87 (discussing credit bidding by se-
cured creditors). Thus, if the creditor forcing the sale is owed $10,000 by the debtor, he
may bid on the collateral up to $10,000 without needing to pay any money (in effect, he
would have to pay himself the money he is bidding).Creditors who bid on and win the collateral obtain several advantages. Creditors often
feel that they will be unable to collect any deficiency from the debtor, therefore they will
bid-in up to the price at which they think they can sell the collateral in an arms-length
transaction. See id. at 86. For example, a debtor would normally be responsible for reim-
bursing any dollar amount that a creditor realizes below the amount of the debtor's debt
(in the above example any amount below $10,000). However, most states have an-
tideficiency statutes which prevent creditors from taking further action on the debt. See id.
at 83-85. Thus, the creditor obtains an advantage by purchasing the collateral in "credit"
because it will make the debtor's right of redemption harder to exercise and will often
allow the creditor to acquire the collateral for an amount significantly less than it could
later be sold for in a market sale.
154 See Steven Wechsler, Through the Looking Glass: Foreclosure By Sale as De Facto Strict
Foreclosure-An Empirical Study of Mortgage Foreclosure and Subsequent Resak 70 CoRNELu L.
REv. 850, 896 (1985).
155 See, e.g., Freudenhei, 189 B.R. at 281. The Freudenheim decision also suggests that if
the debtor and/or trustee chose to offer the property for sale while operating in bankruptcy,
§ 363 of the Bankruptcy Code would give the secured creditor the right to bid-in. See id.
(citing 11 U.S.C. § 363(k) (1994)).
156 502 U.S. 410 (1992).
157 See id. at 417.
158 Freudenheim, 189 B.R. at 281.
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While Congress, when it rewrote § 506(a), may have discouraged
the "hostage value" leverage that secured creditors once used,159 it did
not address the more benign leverage inherent in the repossession-
and-sale remedy that a security interest provides. Recognition of this
leverage favors replacement valuation because wholesale valuation
does not take it into account. The bankruptcyjudge in In reJones160
cogently illustrated this point with the following example:
Assume the debtor owes a creditor $100,000, and that the debt is
secured by a mortgage... which has a fair market value of $80,000.
Assume also that the creditor would incur costs of $10,000 in fore-
closing its mortgage....
Those courts which adjust value under § 506(a) based on hypo-
thetical sales costs would conclude that the creditor in this example
holds an allowed secured claim of $70,000. But there is a distinct
possibility that the creditor could hold out for more ... in exchange
for its forbearance .... [I] t is not likely that the debtor would be
able to find another home comparable to her present one for much
less than $80,000. And if the debtor were forced to relocate, she
probably would incur transaction costs of her own.... [T] he debtor
in this scenario may very well conclude that $80,000 is a reasonable
price to pay to keep her home. Thus[,] . .. liens will often be un-
dervalued if the court disregards the possibility that the creditor
could use the debtor's own transaction costs as leverage in any ne-
gotiations between the parties.161
While claim bifurcation negates this type of leverage in bankruptcy,
proponents of replacement value seize upon the existence of this lev-
erage to make an important point. These proponents note that if
wholesale value theorists insist that a court envision how the secured
creditor's security interest would be valued outside of bankruptcy,162
then the court must also consider the value of the leverage provided
by the security interest.' 63
In their debate over the appropriate valuation standard, replace-
ment and wholesale valuation theorists often failed to consider the
merits of finding a middle ground. However, as discussed below,
prior to the Supreme Court's Rash opinion a few bankruptcy courts
and one circuit court concluded that the midpoint standard of valua-
tion, which represents such a middle ground, comports with both the
statutory language governing valuation and the economic considera-
159 See supra text accompanying notes 111-14.
160 152 B.R. 155 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1993).
161 Jones, 152 B.R. at 185. The use of a house in this example is inaccurate given that
Nobelman has effectively quashed the practice of lien-stripping on the debtor's principal
residence. See supra text accompanying notes 37-38. However, the example works equally
well if one substitutes another piece of property for the house.
162 See supra text accompanying notes 115-23.
163 See, e.g.,Jones, 152 B.R. at 185.
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tions implicated by the bankruptcy system. The next section will look
at those decisions and the rationale supporting a midpoint valuation
standard.
C. The Midpoint Valuation Standard
Prior to the Supreme Court's Rash decision, the Seventh Cir-
cuit 6 4 and a minority of bankruptcy courts165 had adopted the mid-
point valuation standard for valuing secured claims under § 506(a).
Additionally, several bankruptcy courts adopted, in the form of local
rules, the midpoint valuation standard as the starting point for motor
vehicle valuations. 166 Midpoint valuation is the mean between the ad-
judged wholesale value and the retail value of the secured creditor's
collateral. 167
1. Statutory Analysis
Courts adopting the midpoint valuation standard have concluded
that § 506(a) does not mandate the use of any particular valuation
standard, and consequently, economic arguments are paramount
when choosing a valuation standard. 168 In In re Hoskins,169 Judge Pos-
ner first noted the statute, the legislative history, and precedent all
lack definitive authority for any of the valuation standards, and he
then proceeded to make his economic argument.170 Similarly, the
164 See In re Hoskins, 102 F.3d 311, 315 (7th Cir. 1996).
165 See, e.g., In re Mitchell, 191 B.R. 957, 961 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1995); General Motors
Acceptance Corp. v. Valenti (In reValenti), 191 B.R. 521, 522 (N.D.N.Y. 1995), vacated in
part, 105 F.3d 55 (1997); In re Madison, 186 B.R- 182, 184 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1995); In re
Hoskins, 183 B.R. 166, 170 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 1995); In reMyers, 178 B.R. 518, 524 (Bankr.
W.D. Okla. 1995); In re Carlan, 157 B.R- 324, 326 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1993); In re Stauffer,
141 B.R. 612, 614 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1992); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Chapman
(In re Chapman), 135 B.R. 11, 14 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1990); see also Bankruptcy Reform Study
Project, Report from the ABI Consumer Bankruptcy Reform Forum, January 17-18, 1997 (visited
April 9, 1998) <http://wv.abiworld.org/abi/legis/reform/consumerfronhtml> [herein-
after Bankruptcy Reform Study] ("[A] majority of all participants liked the idea of typing the
presumptive value of cars to a regional average between wholesale and retail price as pub-
lished in the NADA book.").
166 See, e.g., In re Sharon, 200 B.R. 181, 195 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1996) (citing local rule
D-3.18.3(g)); Valenti4 191 B.R. at 521.
167 In the context of motor vehicle valuations, this average comes from the wholesale
and retail values that the Bluebook provides. See, e.g., In reYounger, 216 B.R. 649, 656-57
(Bankr W.D. Okla. 1998); In re Jenkins, 215 B.R. 689, 692 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1997)
(describing pre-Rash valuation); In re Franklin, 213 B.R. 781, 783 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1997).
168 See infra Part II.C.2.
169 102 F.3d 311 (7th Cir. 1996).
170 With respect to the statute itself, Posner stated that it was of "little help" in deciding
which valuation standard to choose. Hoskins, 102 F.3d at 314. Posner observed that the
legislative history of § 506(a) "points both toward and away from equating 'creditor's inter-
est' to wholesale value." Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 124, 356 (1978)). Posner
hinted that precedent from other circuits on this subject might have bound his decision,
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court in In re Stauffer'71 found that § 506(a) and its legislative history
merely require courts to contemplate the benefits and risks that any
particular valuation standard imposed to the estate and the credi-
tors.172 Because proponents of midpoint valuation find little direc-
tion from the statute or congressional intent, they focus mainly upon
economic arguments.
2. Economic Analysis
Judge Posner's economic analysis in Hoskins of the competing val-
uation standards reflects the most articulate defense of the midpoint
valuation standard. Hoskins arose out of a Chapter 13 bankruptcy peti-
tion that the debtors, Zandal and Debra Hoskins, filed in November
1994.173 The debtors' Chapter 13 plan valued NBD Bank's ("NBD")
secured claim in the debtors' automobile at $3,987.50, representing
the midpoint between the car's retail value of $4,650 and its wholesale
value of $3,325.174 NBD objected to this valuation and subsequently
filed a proof of secured claim for $4,874.50, which included the retail
value of the car plus interest and attorney's fees. 175
After identifying "the emerging trend embrac[ing] a retail valua-
tion," the bankruptcy court found that the debtor's midpoint valua-
tion was "a fair treatment of the creditor's claim."'1 76 Distinguishing
the cited cases favoring replacement valuation on the ground that
they addressed real property rather than personal property, the court
concluded that the treatment of real property should differ from that
of personal property under § 506(a).17 7 The court reasoned that the
secured creditor likely would dispose of real property to an end user
and thereby receive an amount roughly equivalent to the replacement
value of the collateral.' 7 8 In contrast, the court noted that the secured
creditor would likely dispose of personal property, like the car at issue,
in a wholesale market.17 9 Thus, valuing consumer goods with a re-
placement valuation standard created a windfall for the secured
creditor.'8 0
but that such grounds for decision "drop( ] out when the courts ... cannot agree on the
proper resolution." Id at 313.
171 141 B.R. 612 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1992).
172 See id. at 614 (citing H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 356 (1978)).
173 Hoskins, 183 B.R at 166.
174 See id.
175 See id. Section 1324 allows parties in interest to object to confirmation of the
debtor's plan at the confirmation hearing. See 11 U.S.C. § 1324 (1994).
176 Hoskins, 183 B.R at 167, 170.
177 See id. at 168-69 (citing Arnold B. Cohen, Issues in Consumer Bankruptcy, 2 J. BANKR.
L. & PRAc. 761 (1992)).
178 See id.
179 See id.
180 See id.
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Instead, the bankruptcy court chose to adopt the debtor's
method of valuation, which it described as "the type of pragmatic
compromise often utilized . .. in administering large numbers of
cases."'18 1 The midpoint valuation method, in the court's opinion, sat-
isfied the requirements of § 506(a) and was consistent with the
Supreme Court's Nobelman decision. 182 The court noted that the
Nobelman decision emphasized the importance of recognizing the in-
terplay between different provisions of the Bankruptcy Code when it
held that courts must read § 506(a) in light of § 1322(b) (2) in Chap-
ter 13 cases involving home mortgages. 183 Following the Nobelman
Court's guidance, the Hoskins court surmised that because § 1325
does not require a debtor to pay replacement value if he utilizes the
surrender option, the interplay of § 506(a) and 1325 does not man-
date the use of replacement valuation. 184 Additionally, the court rea-
soned that the interests of unsecured creditors necessarily factor into
the "purpose of the valuation."1 85 Finding that replacement valuation
mirrors the effects of a Chapter 7 reaffirmation, in which the secured
creditor obtains the entire amount of its interest at the expense of
unsecured creditors,186 the court was reluctant to import an identical
treatment of unsecured creditors into the Chapter 13 reorganization
process.' 87 Ultimately, the court limited its ruling to (1) Chapter 13
consumer reorganizations involving collateral that is "not income pro-
ducing," 8 and (2) cases in which the debtor "will not reap a windfall"
by using midpoint valuation. 189
Affirming the decisions of both the bankruptcy judge and the dis-
trict court that heard NBD's initial appeal, 190 Judge Posner, writing
for a unanimous panel, ignored the ad hoc, case-by-case approach to
valuing secured claims in Chapter 13-an approach advanced by sev-
eral bankruptcy courts and arguably grounded in the statute's legisla-
181 Id. at 169.
182 See id. at 170.
183 See id. (citing Nobelman v. American Say. Bank, 113 S. Ct. 2106, 2108 (1993)).
184 See id,
185 Id. at 170.
186 In Chapter 7, debtors can retain the collateral by reaffirming their debt to the
secured creditor. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(f). In most cases, this results in the reinstatement of
the prepetition debt. In Chapter 13, cram down allows the debtor, in effect, to reaffirm
the debt at whatever value the bankruptcy court fixes on the collateral.
187 See Hoskins, 183 B.R. at 169-70.
188 Id. at 170. Precisely what the court meant by "non-income producing" collateral is
unclear. Courts have often argued that debtors can only continue to create the income
stream necessary to their plan through the retention of their vehicle. See supra note 149.
Indeed, debtors often file Chapter 13 cases as a result of the imminent loss of their vehicle,
which would render them unable to get to and from work. Apparently, the Hoskins court
had commercial property in mind.
189 Hoskins, 183 B.R. at 170.
190 The district court's affirmation was unreported.
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five history.19 1 In Posner's opinion, such an ad hoc approach
increased the risk that "the costs of bankruptcy litigation [would]
eat[ ] up the entire debtor's estate."'192 Posner maintained that while
every case presents different facts regarding the nature and condition
of the collateral, these different facts do not require that the standard
of valuation change.' 93 As a result, the court held that the midpoint
valuation standard that the Seventh Circuit adopted should apply
when valuing any Chapter 13 secured claim. 194
Posner settled on the midpoint valuation standard by identifying
and analyzing the relationship between the debtor and the secured
creditor as a "bilateral monopoly."1 95 A bilateral monopoly exists
when two parties possess the ability to bargain over an item without
the influence of competition, such as threatening to sell to a third
party.196 Analyzing the relationship between the Hoskinses and NBD
in this paradigm, Posner assessed the market forces driving each of
the parties. If the Hoskinses had defaulted on their loan from NBD,
the bank would have repossessed the car and likely sold it at wholesale
value because the bank was not in the retail automotive business.' 9 7
Assessing the value of the car to the Hoskinses, Posner identified the
car as a necessity for a successful reorganization rather than a luxury.
He then noted that in order to replace the car, the debtors must pay
the retail price from a dealer. 19 8 Thus, based on this bilateral monop-
oly analysis the correct value of the car lies somewhere between the
wholesale and retail prices.
While Posner admitted that predicting the precise point at which
the bargain would be struck within this range is impossible, he posited
that the best solution would be to split the difference. Using tenets of
191 See infra Part II.D.
192 Hoskins, 102 F.3d 311, 314 (7th Cir. 1996).
193 See id.
194 See id. at 316. Posner limited the court's holding to Chapter 13 cases, and hinted
that for cases involving assets with sentimental value to the debtor, or in the case of real
property, the bargaining range may be different than that which the court discussed in
Hoskins. See id at 317. Posner left such valuations to "another day." Id.
195 Id. at 315.
196 For examples of Posner's use of the bilateral monopoly paradigm in other settings,
see Walgreen Co. v. Sara Creek Property Co., 966 F.2d 273, 276 (7th Cir. 1992); Milbrew,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 710 F.2d 1302, 1306-07 (7th Cir. 1983).
197 See Hoskins, 102 F.3d at 315. Posner did not discuss whether the creditor's ability to
sell the car for something greater than wholesale would affect his analysis, but it appears
that Posner would likely readjust the value in such a case.
198 See id. Based on his treatment of the car as a necessity, Posner characterized the
retail valuation advocates' concerns-that the debtor will sell the car for retail, thereby
receiving a windfall to the extent that the court valued the collateral at less than retail-as
'a chimera." Md; see also supra text accompanying note 149 (discussing this windfall in the
context of replacement valuation). Posner pointed out that the debtor is unlikely to sell
the car for retail because he cannot offer a "meaningful warranty." Hoskins, 102 F.3d at
315.
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game theory, Posner identified the midpoint as a focal point for bar-
gaining, noting that the midpoint serves as "a natural point to which
bargaining parties will gravitate if they don't want to waste a lot of
time in bluffing and haggling."' 99 According to Posner, fixing the
value of the secured creditor's claim at this focal point is superior to
either of the other two valuation theories, given "the underlying eco-
nomics of the situation."200
Posner challenged proponents of the foreclosure valuation stan-
dard, which purports to value collateral based on what the collateral
would garner outside of bankruptcy, by pointing out two inconsisten-
cies in their argument. First, Posner argued that one "commercially
reasonable disposition" of the creditor's security interest would be to
allow the defaulting. debtor to reaffirm the obligation.201 This reaffir-
mation, in turn, would allow a creditor, who uses the original security
interest as leverage, to realize a greater value than he would otherwise
receive through a forced sale.2 0 2 Posner considered it an impossibility
to attach a certain value to the bank's lien in a nonbankruptcy world,
making the compromise of the midpoint standard even more appeal-
ing.20 3 Second, Posner was concerned that awarding wholesale value
would create a windfall for unsecured creditors. He reasoned that the
extra money the unsecured creditors would receive in a Chapter 13
plan, in contrast to a liquidation of the collateral, is available only
because the debtor can retain the vehicle and thereby continue to
earn a regular income that might allow the unsecured creditors to
recover a part of their claims.20 4 Addressing the replacement valua-
tion standard, Posner opined that awarding the replacement value of
collateral would "reward the bank for its [ability] outside of bank-
ruptcy to threaten to take away the Hoskinses' car and with it perhaps
their livelihood." 20 5
Lower courts applying the midpoint valuation standard have
taken a variety of routes to reach their conclusions. The most well-
reasoned bankruptcy court decision favoring midpoint valuation is In
re Stauffer.206 The Stauffer court maintained that awarding wholesale
value inadequately compensates the creditor for the risk of failure of
199 Id. at 316 (citing DouLAS G. BAIRD E AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAw 39 (1994)).
200 Id.
201 Id.
202 See id. Judge Easterbrook took issue with the award of this leverage value in his
concurring opinion. See id. at 318-19 (Easterbrook, J., concurring).
203 See id. at 316.
204 See id. at 317. This argument is analogous to that which proponents of retail valua-
tion have made. See supra notes 149-51 and accompanying text.
205 Hoskins, 102 F.3d at 317.
206 141 B.R. 612 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1992).
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the Chapter 13 plan. 20 7 Yet, the court hesitated to award replacement
value because it was far in excess of the amount the secured creditor
would receive in a repossession sale. 20 8 The court instead settled
upon a midpoint valuation as the "most equitable approach."20 9
D. Valenti and the Ruleless Approach
The Second Circuit advocated a fourth approach in its General
Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Valenti (In re ValentiP1 ° decision. Rather than
adopting a uniform standard of valuation for every case, the Valenti
court held that "no fixed value... should be imposed on every bank-
ruptcy court conducting a § 506(a) valuation."'21  Instead, the court
ruled that any standard of valuation may serve as the "starting point
the court uses to reach the ultimate value of the claim"21 2 so long as
the court considers the two criteria that § 506(a) provides: the pur-
pose of the valuation, and the proposed disposition and use of the
collateral.21 3 Specifically, the court affirmed the bankruptcy court's
decision to value the debtor's car at the average of the wholesale and
retail values in accordance with a local bankruptcy rule that mandated
this valuation method.214
The Valenti court found the statutory language of § 506(a)
"rather amorphous," 215 stating that although the first sentence im-
plied that the value "should be fixed at the collateral's liquidation-or
wholesale-value," the "disposition or use" language in the second
sentence required courts to "account for the likely replacement cost
of the . . . vehicle."216 Recognizing the circuit split over the proper
207 See id. at 613-14. For further discussion of this risk, see supra text accompanying
notes 84-85.
208 See Stauffer, 141 B.R. at 614.
209 Id. Other courts have espoused midpoint value as an equitable solution to the
valuation debate. See, e.g., In re Myers, 178 B.R. 518, 524 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1995) (stating
that midpoint valuation "represents a compromise" that "will provide an equitable result").
210 105 F.3d 55 (2d Cir. 1997).
211 Id. at 62. The Ninth Circuit's decision in Taffi v. United States (In re Taffi), 96 F.3d
1190 (9th Cir. 1996), overruling its earlier decision in In re Mitchell 954 F.2d 557 (9th Cir.
1992), is another example of a court advocating a ruleless approach, insofar as Mitchell
advocated a specific valuation method-the foreclosure method. The Taffi court rejected
this method, stating that "value is to be determined by the facts presented to the bank-
ruptcy court." Taffi, 96 F.3d at 1193; see alsoJohnson v. General Motors Acceptance Corp.
(In reJohnson), 165 B.R. 524, 529 (S.D. Ga. 1994) ("A fixed 'wholesale' or 'retail' standard
for . . . valuations is inconsistent with § 506(a)'s aversion to standardized procedure.");
David Gray Carlson, Car Wars: Valuation Standards in Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Cases, 13 BANKR.
DEV. J. 1, 7 (1996) ("[Ajppellate courts should not even try to legislate a choice.... In-
stead, valuations should be viewed as a question of fact, consigned to the discretion of the
fact finder.").
212 Valent4 105 F.3d at 62.
213 See id.
214 See id. at 58.
215 Id. at 59.
216 Id. at 61.
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valuation standard, the court took issue with awarding "retail value"
on the ground that such a valuation "ignores... the creditor's interest[,
which] . . .must be taken into account. '217
The court found support for its ruleless approach in the legisla-
tive history of § 506(a). The court noted that Congress intended
value to be determined on a "'case-by-case basis"' and explained that
mandating either wholesale or replacement value would render one
of the dual considerations-purpose and disposition-impractica-
ble.2 18 By allowing a case-by-case determination, the court favored the
exercise of discretion by bankruptcy judges.21 9 The court concluded
that this type of fact-sensitive inquiry would prevent creditors from
extracting hostage value from the debtor and thereby promote equity
between the competing creditors in the case.220
In contrast to the ruleless approach of Valenti, the majority of
courts deciding valuation issues apply a rule of law, regardless of
which rule they choose.22' For example, Judge Posner stated:
[I] t is one thing to say that a uniform standard of valuation must be
applied case by case, since application depends on the facts and
they are different from case to case. It is another thing to say that
there is no standard.... These are tiny cases. The debtor usually
has few assets. To prevent the costs of bankruptcy litigation from
eating up the entire debtor's estate, a simple rule of valuation is
needed. 222
Courts choosing to prescribe valuation standards as a matter of law,
however, often maintain that the chosen method is merely a starting
point for their determination. The particular valuation standard may
be altered to a strictly retail price, a wholesale price, or the midpoint
of those two prices, depending on the specific facts of the case. 223
217 Id. at 62.
218 Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 356 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.N.
5787, 5963, 6312).
219 See id.
220 See id.; see also supra text accompanying notes 111-14, 159-63 (discussing hostage
value in the context of the wholesale and replacement value standards).
221 See In re Hoskins, 102 F.3d 311, 314 (7th Cir. 1996); NA-noNAL BANuut. REv. Comm'N,
supra note 132, at 243-45.
222 Hoskins, 102 F.3d at 314 (citation omitted); see also In re Maddox, 200 B.R. 546, 549
(D.NJ. 1996) (reviewing de novo a bankruptcy court's interpretation of law).
223 See, e.g., Hobbs v. Gurley Motor Co. (In re Hobbs), 204 B.R. 994, 998-99 (Bankr. D.
Ariz. 1997) (finding fair market value to be the appropriate standard, but then requiring
specific evidence, i.e. appraisals or experts, to value the particular collateral); Maddox 194
B.R. at 770 ("Upon appropriate evidentiary showing ... measurement of value may be
adjusted in a particular case.").
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III
THE SuPREME COURT'S DECISION IN RASH
A. Background
The facts of Rash mirror those found in the typical, Chapter 13
vehicle-valuation cases. However, the legal history and procedural
posture of the Rash case were decidedly unique. Elray Rash
purchased a Kenworth tractor truck in 1989 for use in his freight-haul-
ing business. 224 He borrowed a portion of the purchase price from
the seller, who then assigned the loan to Associates Commercial Cor-
poration ("ACC").225 In 1992, Rash and his wife filed a petition under
Chapter 13.226 At the time of the filing, the Rashes owed $41,171 on
the loan.227 The Rashes' Chapter 13 plan proposed to pay ACC,
through fifty-eight monthly payments, the present value of the truck,
which the petition alleged was $28,500.228 ACC objected to the valua-
tion and countered that their claim was fully secured up to the
amount of the loan.229 In a valuation hearing, the Rashes' expert val-
ued the truck at $31,875, estimating that this was the net amount that
ACC would receive upon foreclosure. 2 0 ACC's expert maintained
that the truck should be valued at $41,000, representing the amount
the Rashes would have to pay to purchase a like vehicle. 231 The bank-
ruptcy court adopted the Rashes' wholesale valuation, fixed the
amount of ACC's secured claim at $31,875, and approved the Rashes'
Chapter 13 plan.23 2 The United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Texas affirmed this ruling.233 A panel of the Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's decision and
held that replacement value was the correct measure of value.23 4
However, on a rehearing en banc, the Fifth Circuit reversed its panel
decision, finding that the bankruptcy court used the proper method
of valuation and correctly fixed the amount of the collateral at its
wholesale value.2 35
224 SeeAssociates Commercial Corp. v. Rash (In reRash), 117 S. Ct. 1879, 1882 (1997).
225 See id.
226 See id.
227 See id.
228 See id. at 1883.
229 See id.
230 See id.
231 See id.
232 See id. For the bankruptcy court's decision, see In re Rash, 149 B.R. 430 (Bankr.
E.D. Tex. 1993).
233 See Rash 117 S. Ct. at 1883. The district court's decision is unreported.
234 See id. For the Fifth Circuit's panel opinion, see Associates Commercial Corp. v.
Rash (In re Rash), 31 F.3d 325 (5th Cir. 1994), modified, 62 F.3d 685 (5th Cir. 1995).
235 See Rash, 117 S. Ct. at 1883 (discussing the Fifth Circuit's majority opinion in Associ-
ates Commercial Corp. v. Rash (In re Rash), 90 F.3d 1036 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc)); see
also supra Part II.A (highlighting the Fifth Circuit's rationale in Rash).
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B. The Majority's Adoption of Replacement Value
Justice Ginsburg, writing for the eight-member majority, rejected
both the foreclosure value and midpoint value standards in favor of
what she called the "replacement value" standard: "we hold, the value
of the property [in a Chapter 13 cram down] ... is the price a willing
buyer in the debtor's trade, business, or situation would pay to obtain
like property from a willing seller."236 The majority's short opinion
neither contributed new arguments for adopting a replacement value
standard nor rebutted the wholesale and midpoint valuation argu-
ments at length. Rather, the Court perfunctorily recapped the tradi-
tional arguments for adopting the replacement value standard.2 37
The majority first focused on the language of § 506(a). Like the
lower courts that espoused the replacement value standard, the major-
ity found that the first sentence of § 506 (a) "imparts no valuation stan-
dard."238 Instead, according to the Rash Court, the sentence merely
suggests that partial ownership by the debtor, or the junior or
subordinated lien status of the creditor, may complicate a comparison
between the creditor's claim and the value of the entire property.239
In those cases, the first sentence of § 506(a) "tells a court what it must
evaluate ... ; it is not enlightening on how to value collateral." 240 The
majority found the "proposed disposition or use" language from the
second sentence of § 506(a) "of paramount importance to the valua-
tion question."241 The Court concluded that applying the foreclosure
value standard rendered the second sentence surplusage, whereas use
of replacement valuation rendered those words meaningful. 2 42 The
Court chose not to give any weight to the legislative history of
§ 506(a), noting that the history was "unedifying" and "not
enlightening."243
The majority also focused on the economic risks that the whole-
sale value standard poses for creditors. Because use of the Chapter 13
cram down power necessarily involves the debtor's retention and use
of the property, the majority noted that the creditor may "obtain[ ] at
once neither the property nor its value."244 Adjustments in the inter-
est rate or adequate protection payments, the majority explained,
would not adequately compensate creditors for the risks of subse-
quent default by the debtor and the concomitant loss of value
236 Rash, 117 S. Ct. at 1884.
237 See id at 1884-86.
238 Id. at 1884.
239 See id. at 1884-85.
240 Id. at 1885.
241 Id.
242 See id.
243 Id at 1886 n.4. Justice Scalia chose not to join footnote 4 of the majority opinion.
244 Id. at 1885.
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through rapid depreciation of the vehicle. 245 Adoption of the re-
placement value standard would be the only means of providing ade-
quate compensation. 246
The Supreme Court dismissed the Fifth Circuit's argument that
the replacement value standard does not adequately reflect the re-
course available to the creditor under state law and noted that the
operation of the cram down provision, as well as the operation of the
Bankruptcy Code as a whole, has already displaced the fights of se-
cured creditors vis-a.-vis state law.247 As the Court pointed out, adop-
tion of the replacement value standard "disrupts" state law "no more"
than the operation of the Bankruptcy Code as a whole.248
The majority also dismissed the midpoint valuation standard, as
well as the ruleless approach of the Valenti court, stating that there was
"no warrant for it" within the statutory language of § 506(a). 249 The
Court rejected Judge Posner's conclusion that the language of
§ 506(a) "suggests no particular valuation method" and read § 506(a)
to "suppl[y] a governing instruction less complex" than Posner's mid-
point value standard.250
C. Justice Stevens's Dissent
Justice Stevens's one-page dissent in Rash offers a different inter-
pretation of the statutory language and draws upon the economic
analysis set forth by Judge Easterbrook in his concurring opinion in
Hoskins.251 Stevens stated that the first sentence of § 506(a) "suggests
that the value should be determined from the creditor's perspec-
tive," 252 which mirrors the statutory interpretation arguments of lower
courts espousing the foreclosure value standard. 255 Stevens then fo-
cused on the "purpose of the valuation" language in the second sen-
tence and maintained that a cram down merely directs the debtor to
pay the present value of the creditor's secured claim, which the first
sentence already has established as the creditor's interest.2 54 There-
fore, as Stevens stated, "[tihe 'purpose' . . . of the valuation under
§ 506(a), is to put the creditor in the same shoes as if he were able to
exercise his lien and foreclose. '255
245 See id.
246 See id.
247 See id. at 1886.
248 Id.
249 Id.
250 Id. (discussing In re Hoskins, 102 F.3d 311, 315 (7th Cir. 1996)).
251 See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
252 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
253 See supra Part II.A1.
254 See Rash, 117 S. Ct. at 1887 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
255 Id (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Stevens then built on judge Easterbrook's concurrence in Hoskins
and stated that awarding more than foreclosure value would grant a
windfall to the undersecured creditors at the expense of the un-
secured creditors.256 Foreclosure value, in contrast, "is ... consistent
with the larger statutory scheme by keeping the respective recoveries
of secured and unsecured creditors the same throughout the various
bankruptcy chapters."257
Finally, Stevens argued that, contrary to the majority's assertion
that "surrender and retention are not equivalent acts," the present
value requirement in § 1325(a) (5) (B) (ii) does protect creditors be-
cause the interest rate will fluctuate with the amount of risk that the
debtor presents. 258 Additionally, § 361's adequate protection provi-
sion addresses the Court's concern about rapid depreciation.2 59 Ste-
vens asserted that these protections put the creditor who is forced to
allow the debtor to retain the collateral in essentially the same posi-
tion that he would have been in had surrender occurred.260
IV
THE TREATmENT OF RASH BY THE COURTS, LEGIsLATORs,
AND THE BANI Rui'rcv SYSTEM: WHY MIDPOINT
VALUATION WILL NOT AND SHOULD
NOT Go AWAY
A. Bankruptcy Courts' Treatment of Rash
Bankruptcy courts' treatment of Rash confirms commentators'
fears that Rash would provide little help in establishing a consistent
valuation standard for Chapter 13 cram downs.261 In cases decided
the first year following Rash, courts have valued collateral at retail
value262 and midpoint value,265 or they have used a fact-specific, rule-
less approach.2 64 Contrary to the prediction' of the National Bank-
ruptcy Review Commission that "[c] aselaw will in short order coalesce
256 See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
257 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
258 See id. at 1887 n.* (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Carlson, supra note 211, at 15
(discussing the risk component of the cram down interest rate).
259 See Rash, 117 S. Ct. at 1887 n.* (Stevens, J., dissenting).
260 See hi. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
261 See, e.g., Laurie B. Williams, The Rash Decision: Is "Replacement Value" a Terminal Case
of Poison Ivy or a Mild Case of Eczema?, NORTON BANKR. L. ADviSER, June 1997, at 9, 11 ("Rash
does little to promote certainty or simplicity... although the court does recognize the
important interests of predictability and uniformity.").
262 See ln reJones, 219 B.R. 506, 508 (Bankr. N.D. IU. 1998); In reJenkins, 215 B.R. 689,
691 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1997); In reRussell, 211 B.R. 12, 13 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1997).
263 See In re Oglesby, 221 B.R. 515, 519 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1998); In reYounger, 216 B.R.
649, 657 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1998); In re Franklin, 213 B.R. 781, 783 (Bankr. N.D. Fla.
1997).
264 See In re McElroy, 210 B.R. 833, 836-37 (Bankr. D. Or. 1997).
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around replacement value measures that are not as widely different as
the pre-Rash cacophony of standards, ' 265 it appears that Rash has
changed only the rhetoric, and not the realities, of bankruptcy courts'
cram down valuation opinions. The remainder of this section will ex-
amine the post-Rash valuation cases and dissect the divergent analyses
and approaches to interpreting the Court's tangled opinion.
1. Cases Continuing To Use the Midpoint Valuation
Despite Rash's explicit rejection of the Hoskins and Valenti deci-
sions, some lower courts have continued to use the midpoint valuation
standard as the starting point for cram down valuations.2 66 These
courts have focused on footnote six in Rash for the proposition that
replacement value does not preclude using the average between
wholesale and retail value as a starting point for valuation.2 67 Further-
more, the discretion that the Court apparently handed bankruptcy
judges in footnote six resembles the same discretion that the Second
Circuit praised in Valenti. Footnote six of the Rash opinion reads:
[T] he replacement-value standard... leaves to bankruptcy courts,
as triers of fact, identification of the best way of ascertaining re-
placement value on the basis of the evidence presented. Whether
replacement value is the equivalent of retail value, wholesale value,
or some other value will depend on the type of debtor and the na-
ture of the property.... [R]eplacement value ... should not in-
clude ... portions of the retail price, if any, that reflect the value of
items the debtor does not receive when he retains his vehicle
268
Four bankruptcy court decisions-In re Oglesby,269 In re Younger,270 In re
Franklin,271 and In re Glueck27 2-addressing the post-Rash valuation of
vehicles in cram down have seized on footnote six as grounds for con-
tinuing to use midpoint valuation.
In Franklin, the court identified the Supreme Court's misstate-
ment of the Hoskins rule and used this misstatement, in conjunction
with footnote six of Rash, to conclude that midpoint valuation sur-
vived Rash.2 73 In Rash, the Court claimed to reject the midpoint valua-
265 NATIONAL BANKR. REv. CoMM'N, supra note 132, at 46. This portion of the Commis-
sion's report reflects the views of a four-member dissent, which is articulated in Chapter 5,
entitled Recommendations for Reform of Consumer Bankruptcy Law by FourDissenting Commission-
ers. See infra note 343 for a further discussion of the Commission's report.
266 See cases cited supra note 263.
267 See In re Franklin, 213 B.R. at 782-83.
268 Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash (In reRash), 117 S. Ct. 1879, 1886 n.6 (1997).
269 221 B.R. 515 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1998).
270 216 B.R. 649 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1998).
271 213 B.R. 781 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1997).
272 No. 98-52667, 1998 WL 480652 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio Aug. 12, 1998).
273 See Franklin, 213 B.R. at 782.
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tion that Posner embraced in Hoskins, describing Posner's approach
as "pickling] the midpoint between foreclosure and replacement val-
ues."2 74 However, in the Hoskins opinion, Posner approved a mid-
point standard that valued collateral -at "the average of the retail and
the wholesale value."275 This misstatement of Hoskins's holding, in light
of the definition of replacement value as either "retail value" or
"wholesale value" in footnote six of Rash, led the Franklin court to con-
clude that "the decision in Rash [does not] dictate[ ] any change in
methodology [from the midpoint value method] .-276 The court thus
sidestepped Rash's explicit rejection of Hoskins's split-the-difference
method by stating that the midpoint rule serves merely as a starting
point, not as an absolute value.27 7 The Franklin court concluded that
"the Supreme Court has allowed bankruptcy courts to move the ap-
propriate measure of replacement value back to some point between
wholesale and retail values." 2 78
The court in Younger engaged in a similar analysis of Rash and
held that "arbitrarily fixing the average of the retail and wholesale...
values as the starting point for valuation . . . [does not] violate the
dictates of Rash."279 First, the court stated that retail value, as pro-
vided by the Bluebook, "include[s] at least two of the items which
Rash specifically stated should not be included in determining re-
placement value: inventory storage and reconditioning." 280 Because
the prices that dealers charge consumers take into account these
items of value, and are thereby included in the Bluebook's valuation,
a vehicle's replacement value will always be less than its retail value.28 '
Second, because Rash requires courts to determine the price "a willing
buyer in the debtor's... situation would pay.., to obtain" the vehi-
cle,28 2 a debtor would not, barring extraordinary circumstances, re-
place the vehicle in the wholesale market.28 3 The court held that
these two factors "lead[ ] to the conclusion that replacement value as
described in Rash... is in virtually every case going to be some value
between.., wholesale and retail. '284 Thus, the court emphasized that
footnote six in Rash gives bankruptcy courts "a license . . . to deter-
mine valuation in a manner very close to . . . Valenti, and that the
274 Rash, 117 S. Ct at 1886 (emphasis added).
275 In re Hoskins, 102 F.3d 311, 316 (7th Cir. 1996) (emphasis added).
276 Franklin, 213 B.R. at 783.
277 See id Using the midpoint merely as a starting point would seem to contradict
Rash's rejection of Valents case-by-case methodology. See Rash, 117 S. Ct. at 1886 n.5.
278 Franklin, 213 B.R. at 783.
279 In reYounger, 216 B.R. 649, 656-57 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1998).
280 Id. at 656.
281 See id.
282 Rash, 117 S. Ct. at 1884.
285 See Younger, 216 B.R. at 652 (citing Rash).
284 Id. at 656.
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[valuation] result ... may be virtually indistinguishable from that
which would have been obtained under Hoskins. 285
In Oglesly, the third post-Rash case to find that the midpoint be-
tween wholesale and retail value is the appropriate starting point for
valuing collateral in Chapter 13, the Court cites Franklin and Younger
approvingly,28 6 and the analysis in Oglesby mirrors the Younger court's
analysis. The Oglesly court, like its post-Rash predecessors, shunned
valuing the collateral at its retail value because Rash insists on omitting
items included in the retail price that the debtor does not receive
upon retaining the collateral. 28 7 Similarly, the Oglesby court found
that valuing the collateral at wholesale value would not accurately rep-
resent the market in which the debtor would be replacing the collat-
eral.288 Given these two facts, the court found that affixing a
midpoint value to the collateral represented the most well-reasoned
reading of Rash.289
The most recent bankruptcy court decision, In re Glueck,290 also
held that midpoint valuation is the correct post-Rash valuation stan-
dard for vehicles. Glueck focused on the market in which a debtor
would purchase a needed vehicle. 291 Citing its own experience with
vehicle purchases by a debtor, the court recognized that debtors often
purchased vehicles from "numerous other sources" at prices below re-
tail, thereby "avoiding the overhead costs" included in prices at retail
dealerships. 292 While the court acknowledged that setting the stan-
dard at retail value would be easier for it to manage, the court insisted
that the replacement value market that Rash adopted was "clearly
broader than a purely retail market."293 That fact, combined with
Rash's footnote six requirement of omitting warranties, storage, and
other items, mandated a "discount from retail value."2 94 However, the
court also identified the debtor's "inability to regularly access the
wholesale market" as requiring some upward adjustment from whole-
sale value.295 Thus, the Glueck court, citing with approval the deci-
sions in Franklin, Younger, and Oglesby, adopted the midpoint between
retail and wholesale value as the starting point for Chapter 13 valua-
tions.296 By adopting midpoint valuation as the standard for bank-
285 Id. at 653.
286 See In re Oglesby, 221 B.R. 515, 519 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1998).
287 See id.
288 See id.
289 See id.
290 No. 98-52667, 1998 WL 480652 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio Aug. 12, 1998).
291 See id. at *5.
292 Id.
293 Id.
294 Id.
295 Id.
296 See id.
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ruptcy valuations, these four courts furthered the bankruptcy system's
goals of promoting judicial economy, reducing parties' transaction
costs, and limiting the potential for debtors' and creditors' strategic
activity in the bankruptcy system.2 97
2. Cases Claiming To Use Retail Value
Three post-Rash cases have used the Bluebook retail value of the
debtor's vehicle as the benchmark for valuation, 298 despite the Rash
Court's instruction to omit portions of the retail price "that reflect the
value of items the debtor does not receive" such as inventory storage
costs, reconditioning costs, and warranties. 299 These courts arrived at
their conclusions through varied interpretations of Rash, the compo-
nents of the Bluebook price guide, and the structure of the valuation
process. Before discussing these cases, a detour into the makeup of
Bluebook retail and wholesale values is necessary to understand how
to apply Rash's footnote six adjustment of value to the frequently used
Bluebook.
a. Components of Bluebook Wholesale and Retail Values
The Bluebook, more formally known as the N.A.D.A. Official Used
Car Guide, lists both a "retail" and a "trade-in or wholesale" price for
used vehicles.300 Although the Bluebook neither reveals the entirety
of the components going into each value nor delineates the specific
differences between retail and wholesale value, some guidance may be
gleaned from a publisher's note printed on the inside cover. First, the
Bluebook states that its values are based upon "many sources of infor-
mation, including reports of actual'transactions."30' Thus, some com-
ponent of its retail value appears to reflect a seller's asking price,30 2
rather than the price at which a willing buyer and a willing seller actu-
297 See infra Part III.C-D.
298 See In reJenkins, 215 B.R. 689, 692 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1997); In re Gates, 214 B.R.
467, 471-72 (Bankr. D. Md. 1997); In re Russell, 211 B.R. 12, 13 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1997).
299 Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash (In reRash), 117 S. Ct. 1879, 1886 n.6 (1997).
300 NADA OFCICIAL USED CAR GUIDE, EASTERN EDITION (June 1998) [hereinafter
1998 N.A.D.A. GUIDE]. The Guide is published monthly and has several different editions
for different regions of the country, reflecting changes in price, which depend on the
strength or weakness of the regional markets.
301 Id. publisher's note.
302 Whether discrepancies exist between wholesale asking prices and actual sales is
more uncertain. While a potential discrepancy between the asking prices and actual sales
prices in retail transactions may be identified easily due to the traditional haggling be-
tween buyer and seller, the discrepancy between buyer and seller in wholesale transactions
is harder to identify, at least insofar as wholesale prices reflect the most common transac-
tions in the wholesale market, dealer auctions, and sales between dealers.
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ally completed the transaction.303 Operating on this assumption,
some portion of the retail value should be deducted to reflect the
difference between a seller's asking price and the consummated trans-
action. Second, the Bluebook assumes that a vehicle is "clean" and
that "[aippropriate deductions should be made for reconditioning
costs incurred to put the vehicle in salable condition."30 4 Thus, in the
likely event that the debtor's vehicle is not "clean,"30 5 the Bluebook
value, whether retail or wholesale, will overstate the value that the
Rash Court mandates because it does not deduct reconditioning
costs. 30 6 Third, the Bluebook's retail value includes the possibility of
"a limited warranty or guarantee and possibly a current safety and/or
emission inspection."30 7 However, such warranties comprise another
element of value that the Rash Court expressly excluded from replace-
ment value in footnote six. 308 Thus, to the extent that the retail value
reflects such warranties, however limited, courts should exclude them
from their valuation. Deducting these three elements from the retail
value makes sense because a willing seller would not attempt to charge
a willing buyer for items that were not included with the vehicle.
After deducting these elements of retail price, the dealer's mar-
keting costs, and in some instances its inventory storage costs, still re-
main important elements that separate retail and wholesale value.30 9
The Bluebook likely includes at least some element of these costs in its
retail value because this value appears to reflect a component of the
seller's asking price, 310 which naturally will account for all of the
seller's costs. The Rash Court, however, provides conflicting guidance
concerning both of these costs. First, the Court's footnote six does
not specifically target marketing costs for exclusion from retail
value.311 But following the three elements that the Court does target
for exclusion, it cites a portion of the Fifth Circuit's Rash opinion that
303 Cf. Braucher, supra note 17 (manuscript at 21 n.93) (discussing an interview with
the managing editor of the Bluebook in which the editor stated that the guide "strives" to
approximate actual sales prices by retail dealers).
304 1998 N.A.D.A., supra note 300, publisher's note.
305 Some examples might include: the vehicle has extensive wear and tear, needs
bodywork or other mechanical work, or needs new tires or interior work. See About the
N.A.D.A. Official Used Car Guide (visited July 10, 1998) <http://www.nada.com/public/
ConsumerGuide.htm>.
306 See Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash (In re Rash), 117 S. Ct. 1879, 1886 n.6
(1997).
307 About the N.A.D.A. Official Used Car Guide, supra note 305; see also Braucher, supra
note 17 (manuscript at 23) (explaining that the Bluebook retail values reflect informal
dealer warranties, such as allowing exchanges).
308 See Rash, 117 S. Ct. at 1886 n.6.
309 See Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash (In re Rash), 90 F.3d 1036, 1051-52 (5th
Cir. 1996), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 1879 (1997).
310 See supra note 302 and accompanying text.
311 SeeRash, 117S. Ct. at 1886 n.6.
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mentions four elements of value: inventory storage, reconditioning,
warranties, and marketing costs.3 12 Thus, the Court may have intended
to omit marketing costs from retail value. Second, despite the Court's
explicit guidance as to inventory storage costs and implicit guidance
as to marketing costs, it is difficult to reconcile the Court's "willing
buyer/willing seller" language31 3 with the deduction of either of these
costs from retail value. The existence of a willing buyer and a willing
seller implies an element of seller profit, which in turn implies that
the seller recoups all of its costs. Therefore, this language seems to
indicate that replacement value, in some instances, should include
both the seller's marketing and inventory storage costs.
As one commentator has noted, the facts of the Rash case provide
a perfect example of the problem with deducting marketing and in-
ventory storage costs from the collateral's value.31 4 The debtor in
Rash sought to replace a tractor-truck.31 5 The debtor likely will not
find a willing seller through an advertisement in the local paper, but
instead will need to contact a retail dealer. Thus, courts that apply the
willing buyer/willing seller language under these circumstances
should focus on the retail seller-to-private buyer market. In this type
of market the dealer would recoup his costs of marketing and storage
from the buyer through an increased price, and it therefore seems
appropriate to include both costs in the collateral's retail valuation
despite footnote six's prescription. Alternatively, if the collateral is
something that more often is subject to purchase in the private seller-
to-private buyer market (e.g., a car), it may be more appropriate for a
court to exclude at least inventory storage costs. Under these circum-
stances the seller most likely does not factor inventory storage costs
into his asking price, and the Court's instructions to deduct these
costs now seem to reconcile with its willing buyer/willing seller lan-
guage. In sum, the Rash Court appears to acknowledge that market-
ing and inventory storage costs should not always be deducted from
the retail price.
Returning to the Bluebook's retail value, it becomes apparent
why, under Rash, some portions of this value-warranties and recondi-
tioning-should be deducted and other portions-marketing and in-
ventory storage-should not. Deducting the value of warranties and
reconditioning while allowing the inclusion of marketing and storage
costs would cause the vehicle's value to fall somewhere between the
Bluebook's retail and wholesale prices. Although not the only argu-
312 See id. (citing Rash, 90 F.3d at 1051-52).
313 See Rash, 117 S. Ct. at 1884.
314 See David G. Epstein et al., Collateral Valuation Arguments After Associates Commer-
cial Corporation v. Rash, 7J. BANKm. L. & PRAc. 205, 211 (1998).
315 See Rash, 117 S. Ct. at 1882.
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ment for adopting a midpoint valuation standard,3 16 this interpreta-
tion of Rash, as applied to the Bluebook, would favor such a standard.
One post-Rash commentator, Professor Jean Braucher, has advo-
cated the use of wholesale value, as given in the Bluebook, as the
proper method of vehicle valuation.317 Braucher argues that Rash di-
rects courts toward the private seller-to-private buyer market as the
proper basis for determining replacement value.318 Because the Rash
Court held that items the debtor does not receive should be deducted
from replacement value, Braucher finds the private seller-to-private
buyer market, more specifically a sale "initiated as a classified adver-
tisement or putting a sign in the window of a car to be sold," the mar-
ket that would most closely approximate sales at this discounted
value.3 19 Braucher also concludes that "the inclusion of the example
'inventory storage' shows that the Court wants bankruptcy courts to
subtract from retail value the costs of retail selling."320 Braucher iden-
tifies Bluebook wholesale value as the best choice for a simple rule.
Even though Bluebook wholesale value derives from a wholesale
dealer-to-retail dealer market, Braucher argues that pressures on a pri-
vate consumer seller, such as a lack of information and a desire to sell
quickly, will force a private consumer seller to take a price approxi-
mating Bluebook wholesale value.321
Several arguments challenge Braucher's choices of market and of
valuation standard. First, even assuming that the private sale is the
correct paradigm from which to view vehicle valuation, Braucher fails
to consider important characteristics of the private seller. A private
seller may easily overcome informational deficiencies by consulting a
valuation guide. Further, even if Braucher chooses to omit the private
seller's "inventory storage" costs from retail value, the seller likely
would seek to recover his costs of advertising the sale of the vehicle.
Second, the Court's willing buyer/willing seller language cuts in favor
of looking to the breakdown of actual sales in the market-by retail
dealer and private seller alike-rather than using the value of a single
type of market transaction. To the extent that the market includes
retail seller-to-private buyer transactions, the retail seller should be al-
lowed to recoup its costs of marketing and inventory storage.
316 See infra Part IV.C-D.
317 See Braucher, supra note 17 (manuscript at 4).
318 See id. at 25.
319 Id. at 15.
320 Id. at 14.
321 See id, at 25-26.
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b. How Post-Rash Courts Have Applied Retail Valuation
In the first of the post-Rash cases advocating the use of Bluebook
retail value, In re Russell, 322 the court held that Bluebook retail value
was the appropriate measure for valuing the debtor's vehicle because
it did not include the value of any warranties or reconditioning, costs
which Rash stated should be deducted in vehicle valuations.323 A
downward adjustment of the Bluebook retail price became unneces-
sary.324 Furthermore, the court stated that any deduction from Blue-
book retail value would be inconsistent with Rash's willing buyer/
willing seller language, presumably because the court assumed that
the debtor would only find a willing seller at the retail price given by
the Bluebook.325 However, the Russell court erred in finding that
Bluebook retail value does not include reconditioning costs and war-
ranties-Bluebook retail value does include these elements.326 The
debtor, therefore, likely could find a willing seller who would not
charge for these elements of value if they were not included with the
car. Thus, the Russell court's holding adds little to the valuation
debate.
A second case espousing retail value, In re Gates,327 began the val-
uation process by determining retail value, "as that is the price a con-
sumer would have to pay to replace the vehicle in the consumer
market."3 28 Next, the court deducted the "value of items, if any,
which were included in the retail value but which were not received by
a debtor who retains her vehicle. '3 29 However, instead of applying
these two "rules" for valuation as a matter of law, the Gates court
placed the burden of proof on the debtor to show which items in-
cluded in the retail value she did not receive.330 In this case, the
debtor's argument that wholesale value was the proper value, at least
without more evidence than the wholesale price as given in the Blue-
book, did not provide sufficient proof that she did not receive those
items.33' It appears that the Gates court hoped to force debtors to
prove, through convincing evidence of private sales, that they had a
market other than the retail market available to them. However, this
approach to valuation ignores the fact that the debtor will not always
receive the value of warranties or, if the car is not "clean," the value of
322 211 B.R. 12 (Bankr. E.D.NC. 1997).
323 See Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash (In re Rash), 117 S. Ct. 1879, 1886 n.6.
324 See Russell 211 B.R. at 13.
325 See id. at 14 (citing Rash, 117 S. Ct. at 1884 n.2).
326 See supra text accompanying notes 304-07.
327 214 B.R. 467 (Bankr. D. Md. 1997).
328 IM at 471.
329 Id.
330 See id. at 472.
331 See id. at 472-73.
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reconditioning, even though such costs are included in the Bluebook
retail value.332 Requiring the debtor to prove the omission of these
elements of value in every case would be duplicative, and requiring
the debtor to prove the existence of a private sale market would be
unnecessarily time-consuming.333
The court in In re Jenkins334 suggested the following valuation
standard in lieu of its prior midpoint valuation standard:
Determine the [Bluebook] 'retail' value.... Determine the seller's
cost to obtain the vehicle. Add to that cost the reconditioning costs,
if any, to put the vehicle in saleable condition. Compare the two
figures. If they result in a reasonable spread, use the [Bluebook]
retail price. If they do not ... negotiate an agreed value.33 5
In so ordering, the court intended to allow the seller to recoup his
cost of marketing as represented by the spread between the cost to
obtain and the reconditioning costs. The court expressly noted the
Supreme Court's intimation that "commissions and other costs of
sales... be considered" when making a valuation.33 6 Additionally, the
court found that, despite Rash's prescription to deduct reconditioning
costs, "repairs must be made to put the vehicle in saleable condition.
[Since t] he seller must incur these costs[,] . . .reducing the price by
the amount of the repair costs . . .would result in no profit, and
hence, no willing seller. '3 3 7 The Jenkins court's literal construction of
the hypothetical sale prompted it to add in elements of value, specifi-
cally reconditioning and warranties, that the debtor did not receive.
However, the court's formula is only useful insofar as it provides a tool
for judges to determine the reasonableness of a seller's costs of mar-
keting. To arrive at a more accurate value, the formula should re-
quire, after a finding of reasonable costs of marketing, the deduction
of reconditioning costs as well as any costs of warranty built into the
Bluebook retail price.
A final case interpreting Rash, In re Goodyear,338 does not specifi-
cally address the proper method of vehicle valuation but instead fo-
cuses on the proper interest rate to be imposed on that valuation.
However, it does lend some insight into those elements of value that
may be considered by future courts. In Goodyear, the court calculated
the interest rate payable by a debtor on a secured creditor's Chapter
332 See supra text accompanying notes 304-07.
333 See infra Part IV.C.
334 215 B.R. 689 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1997).
35 I& at 692.
336 Id. at 690.
337 IM at 691.
338 218 B.R. 718 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1998).
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12 secured claim.3 39 Citing the Rash Court's statement about the in-
adequacy of interest rate adjustments and adequate protection as
means of protecting the secured creditor's interest, the Goodyear court
found that Rash requires "that the risk premium be considered in con-
nection with the valuation of collateral. '340 Thus, the creditor was not
entitled to a default premium when calculating the interest rate be-
cause such a premium should have been included in the court's valua-
tion of collateral. 341 In this way, Goodyear signals that pro-debtor
courts may deprive creditors of the value of any increase that Rash's
new valuation standard may give them in the future by preventing
creditors from receiving a default premium in the interest rate.
B. Post-Rash Attempts at Legislative Reform
Shortly after the Rash decision, the National Bankruptcy Review
Commission ("Commission") published its final report identifying
those areas in bankruptcy law in need of reform and proposing possi-
ble changes.3 42 The Commission criticized Rash for falling to resolve
the ambiguities in § 506(a) and for not adopting a baseline standard
that renders bankruptcy courts' fact-intensive analysis unnecessary.3 43
The Commission opposed the adoption of replacement valuation, ex-
plaining that the "numerous practical difficulties" in determining the
value would inevitably lead to a "protracted 'battle of the experts,'
which can dissipate assets that otherwise would be available for distri-
bution. ''344 The Commission challenged the assumption, commonly
made by courts interpreting § 506(a), that this section allows for dif-
ferent valuation standards in different contexts. 345 Additionally, the
Commission found no good argument for applying different stan-
339 Valuation and interest rate questions in Chapter 12 are handled identically to those
questions in a Chapter 13 case.
340 Goodyear, 218 B.R. at 722 (citing Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash (In re Rash),
117 S. Ct. 1879, 1885 (1997)).
341 See i&.
342 See NATIONAL BANnua. REv. COMM'N, supra note 132. The report reflects the final
work of the Commission, which Congress created in 1994 to comprehensively examine the
need for reform in the bankruptcy system. The report contains over 170 recommenda-
tions. In addition, the report contains several vigorous dissents, both with regard to the
substance and the procedure involved in compiling the report.
343 See id. at 243-55. The section of the Commission's report on consumer bankruptcy,
including the discussion of Rash, reflects the views of a five-member majority of the Com-
mission. The other four members of the Commission dissented from many of the recom-
mendations in the consumer bankruptcy section, including the proposal to adopt
wholesale value as the standard of valuation. See id. at 44-47 (containing a dissent in Chap-
ter 5 titled Recommendations for Reform of Consumer Bankruptcy Law by FourDissenting Commis-
sioners). The dissenters instead chose to support "replacement value" as the proper
standard of valuation. See id. at 45.
344 Id. at 248.
345 See supra text accompanying notes 20-21.
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dards of valuation in different chapters of the Bankruptcy Code.3 46 In
lieu of the standard that the Rash Court adopted, the Commission
recommended that a single, uniform standard of valuation apply
throughout the bankruptcy chapters and suggested that "[a] credi-
tor's secured claim in personal property should be determined by the
property's wholesale price. '347
The Commission cited several economic and strategic reasons for
adopting the wholesale standard: the ease of calculation; the promo-
tion of the spirit of compromise; the correlation with state law entitle-
ments; and the advancement of economic efficiency.8 48 First, the
Commission lauded wholesale price as an easily calculable standard,
requiring simply that the court identify the proper market in used
goods from which to derive value.349 Use of such a "bright-line rule"
also "avoids transaction costs in bankruptcy" and promotes judicial ef-
ficiency.350 Second, the Commission identified wholesale price as a
midpoint between foreclosure and retail price, thereby promoting a
spirit of "compromise."35' Notably, the Commission's contention that
using wholesale value constitutes a source of compromise angered the
Commission's dissenters, who pointed out that prior cases have never
"employed a below-wholesale standard."352 Third, the Commission as-
serted that adoption of a wholesale value standard would ensure that
creditors received no less than they would have otherwise received
under state law, pointing out that a lower valuation would give debtors
a windfall in light of their retention of the property.353 Lastly, the
Commission restated Judge Easterbrook's contention in Hoskins that
using wholesale value would ensure that the highest valuing user re-
ceives the collateral. 354 Any value that the debtor pays beyond the
amount that the secured creditor would have received in foreclosure
346 See NATIONAL BANR. REv. COMM'N, supra note 132, at 248-49.
347 Id. at 243. The Commission was not constrained by the current statutory language
of § 506(a) in adopting its recommendation, a luxury that the Rash Court did not share.
348 See id. at 250-55.
349 See id. at 250. For instance, when valuing a vehicle, the wholesale price given in an
industry price guide is appropriate. See id. For less common consumer goods, reference to
the "want ads" or a flea market will yield a correct valuation. See id. at 250-51.
350 Id at 250. The dissenters sought to reduce transaction costs as well, but felt that
"[c]aselaw will in short order coalesce around replacement value measures that are not as
widely different as the pre-Rash cacophony of standards." Id. at 46 post.
351 See id. at 251. The Commission also identified the midpoint value standard, as the
Hoskins court adopted, as a standard that promotes compromise. See id. at 252.
352 Id. at 46 n.76 post.
353 See id. at 254.
354 See id. at 254 n.293 (citing In re Hoskins, 102 F.3d 311, 320 (7th Cir. 1996) (Easter-
brook, J., concurring)).
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merely reflects the debtor's willingness to pay the most for the
collateral.355
In mid-1998, Congress addressed the issue of bankruptcy reform
by introducing several bills in the House and Senate that sought to
clarify the valuation standard of § 506(a).3 56 Although the secured
creditor lobby has tried several times in the past to convince Congress
to enact a more favorable valuation standard in Chapter 13, 357 the
1998 legislation, passed by the House and pending in the Senate, may
be the creditor lobby's strongest chance yet to overturn Rash and the
preceding valuation cases. Section 129 of House Bill 3150, as passed
by the House, would amend § 506(a) by adding the following
language:
In the case of an individual debtor under chapters 7 and 13, such
value with respect to property securing an allowed claim shall be
determined based on the replacement value of such property as of
the date of filing the petition without deduction for costs of sale or
marketing. With respect to property acquired for personal, family,
or household purpose, replacement value shall mean the price a
355 See id. at 254. Although the Commission's recommendation for bright-line rules in
valuations promotes the bankruptcy system's goals ofjudicial economy and reduction of
transaction costs, adoption of either the majority's wholesale value approach or the dis-
sent's replacement value approach would encourage the kind of detrimental strategic ac-
tivity that Hoskins's midpoint standard would minimize. See infra Part IV.C-D.
356 See, e.g., H.R. 3150, 105th Cong. § 128 (1998); H.R. 3146, 105th Cong. § 1(d)
(1998) (seeking to codify "liquidation value" as the standard); H.. 2500, 105th Cong.
§ 111 (1998) (containing provisions similar to House Bill 3150).
357 In the past, the secured creditor lobby has failed to convince Congress to adopt the
following amendment to § 506(a): "[tlhe value of consumer goods which the debtor seeks
... to be retained pursuant to § 1325(a) (5) (B) (ii) of this tifle shall be presumed to be the
established resale market price, if such market exists, as may be determined from the rec-
ognized trade publications or comparable means." S. 2000, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess. § 6
(1982); see also S. 445, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 206 (1983) (same).
Because most reported valuation cases arise in the context of the debtor using Chap-
ter 13 cram down to retain an automobile, see supra text accompanying notes 33-36, courts
often determine replacement value in this context using the Bluebook retail value of the
vehicle. See, e.g., In re Rash, 149 B.R 430, 432 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1993), rev'd 31 F.3d 325
(1994), rev'd en banc, 90 F.3d 1036 (1995), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 758 (1997) ("[T]he marketplace
is so accustomed to using these publications as guidelines that the courts must also use
them."); Arnette v. General Motors Acceptance Corp. (In re Arnette), 156 B.R. 366, 368
(Bankr. D. Conn. 1993) (same); In re Green, 151 B.R. 501, 506 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1993)
(awarding retail value).
However, other courts have calculated replacement value using a different approach
that looks at the replacement cost to the debtor. This approach shuns the retail value of
the collateral in favor of what these courts deem to be a more appropriate calculation of
replacement value, whether that value be retail price, less dealer overhead, commissions,
and profit, see McQuinn v. Dial Fin. Co. (In re McQuinn), 6 BR 890, 899 (Bankr. D. Neb.
1980), the "bid" market price, see In re Klein, 10 B.R. 657, 662 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981), or
some other determination of what constitutes "fair market value," see Taffi v. United States
(In re Taffi), 96 F.3d 1190, 1192 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc). Indeed, it appears that the
Supreme Court in Rash intended to avoid the conflation of replacement value and retail
value. Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash (In reRash), 117 S. Ct. 1879, 1886 n.6 (1997).
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retail merchant would charge for property of that kind considering
the age and condition of the property at the time value is
determined. 358
Although the bill invokes the "replacement value" language of
Rash,3 59 it clearly intends to supplant Rash's deduction of "items the
debtor does not receive" upon retention.36 0 By including the costs of
sale and marketing in the valuation, in addition to specifying the retail
market as the relevant market for valuation purposes, House Bill 3150
would replace Rash and its divergent progeny with a retail price stan-
dard as a new bright-line rule for valuation.5 6' Although'passage of
House Bill 3150 may please secured creditors and those who rightly
sound the need for a bright-line rule of valuation, a closer look at the
strategic effects of adopting a strictly retail approach militate against
passage of this proposed retail valuation standard.3 62
C. The Role of a Bright-Line Rule for Valuation in the
Bankruptcy System
Adopting a system of valuation that forgoes fact-intensive inquir-
ies, which impose considerable transaction costs on debtors, creditors,
and the judicial system, will promote the larger bankruptcy system
goals of reducing litigation and maximizing the value in the bank-
ruptcy estate. 63 Use of a bright-line rule of valuation will result in
lower attorneys' fees for both debtors and creditors, whether the rule
employs the retail or wholesale value the Bluebook gives, the mid-
point of these values, or some other easily applicable standard. Con-
sequently, a bright-line rule would free up money, which the debtor
otherwise would have to pay his lawyer to litigate the valuation pro-
ceedings, for the benefit of the unsecured creditors, 3 64 who would re-
ceive money from the increase in the debtor's estate. The debtor
would enjoy indirect benefits as well because the increased estate may
make the debtor's plan more feasible.3 65 Secured creditors also would
358 H.R. 3150, 105th Cong. § 128 (1998).
359 Rash, 117 S. Ct. at 1886 n.6.
360 Id
361 In cases in which the debtor financed a purchase of personal property by giving a
security interest in that property less than 180 days prior to filing, House Bill 3150 man-
dates valuing the collateral at the contract price, both in the original bankruptcy and in
any bankruptcy filed less than two years after the original filing. See H.R. 3150, 105th
Cong. § 128 (1998).
362 See infra Part IV.D.
363 See NATIONAL BANKR. REv. COMM'N, supra note 132, at 244, 248; Bankruptcy Reform
Study, supra note 165 ("[Jludges were generally critical of valuation hearings as a waste of
resources . . . ."); supra text accompanying notes 221-23.
364 See NATIONAL BANiR. REV. COMM'N, supra note 132, at 244.
365 The benefits would be direct in the case of a reorganization plan that contem-
plated a 100% payout to the unsecured creditors, even prior to the valuation, because the
debtor would receive any amount in excess of full payment to unsecured creditors.
1868 [Vol. 83:1821
BANKRUPTCY VALUATIONS
benefit as a result of less litigation. Although the secured creditor can
recover attorneys' fees from the debtor when the contract allows such
recovery,366 an undersecured creditor's claim for attorneys' fees is
merely added to the portion of its claim that the claim-bifurcation
process renders unsecured.367 Thus, secured creditors who incur at-
torneys' fees in valuation proceedings often pay the bulk-if not all-
of those fees.3 68 Adoption of a bright-line standard will benefit all
parties to the bankruptcy by increasing the estate and by reducing
attorneys' fees for the secured creditor.3 69 In addition, the reduction
in valuation litigation will reduce judicial costs, both in dollars and in
the time lost to the parties in trying to divine the appropriate valua-
tion standard from the divergent approaches of the courts.
Unfortunately, Rash did little to quash the valuation standard de-
bate. Despite the majority's insistence that "'a simple rule of valua-
tion is needed' to serve the interests of predictability and
uniformity,"370 commentators have recognized that the fact-intensive
inquiry that footnote six requires371 undermines the majority's "sim-
ple rule. '3 72 Lower courts applying Rash, for the most part, have cho-
sen to adopt a bright-line rule, at least as a definitive starting point for
negotiation and litigation.373 As one court alertly has pointed out, the
366 See 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (1994).
367 See, e.g., In reByrd, 192 B.R. 917, 919 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1996) (explaining that the
undersecured creditor has an unsecured claim for postpetition attorneys' fees provided for
in a prepetition promissory note, and that the court can estimate the amount of this
claim); see also supra text accompanying notes 11-13 (describing claim bifurcation).
368 However, in the small number of cases in which high percentage payouts to un-
secured creditors occur, secured creditors have little to risk in pursuing aggressive litiga-
tion strategies to ensure a higher valuation. If the secured creditors win, then they retain
more of the lien and protect the present value of their claim. If they lose, they lose only
that percentage of their unsecured claim that the debtor is not paying.
369 For exampleJudge Easterbrook, commenting on Rash, noted that"'[r]eplacement
value cannot be looked up. It must be litigated; and in the process the value of the asset
will be paid out to the lawyers rather than to the creditors.'" NATIONAL BANKR. REv.
COMM'N, supra note 132, at 248 n.271 (quoting Hon. Frank H. Easterbrook, Bankruptcy
Reform, Luncheon Address to the National Bankruptcy Review Commission Chicago Re-
gional Hearing 4 (July 17, 1997)).
370 Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash (In re Rash), 117 S. CL 1879, 1886 (1997)
(quoting In re Hoskins, 102 F.3d 311, 314 (7th Cir. 1996)).
371 Id. at 1886 n.6. Footnote six "leaves to [the individual] bankruptcy courts, as triers
of fact, identification of the best way of ascertaining replacement value." Id.
372 See Williams, supra note 261. Two of the four lower court cases decided after Rash
have emphasized the need to fashion a bright-line rule out of Rash's language. See In re
Younger, 216 B.R. 649, 655 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1998) ("[T]he volume of cases in which the
issue [of cram down valuation] exists ... cries out for the establishment of a starting
point. .. ."); In re Russell, 211 B.R. 12, 14 n.3 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1997) ("This court hears
thousands of chapter 13 cases each year... and an easily applicable standard is essential.").
But see In re McElroy, 210 B.R. 833, 835-37 (Bankr. D. Or. 1997) (determining the value
based upon experts' testimony and actual sales prices).
373 See, e.g., Younger, 216 B.R at 656; In re Franklin, 213 B.R. 781, 783 (Bankr. N.D. Fla.
1997).
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majority of valuation disputes involve differences of less than $3,000,
and thus a proper valuation standard should offer a fair starting point
for negotiation. 374 Thus, while this section recommends that courts
adopt a single, bright-line rule to reduce costs for debtors, creditors,
and the judiciary, the task remains to decide which valuation standard
to adopt.
D. The Role of the Midpoint Valuation Standard in the
Bankruptcy System
In order to understand why the courts should adopt the midpoint
between the replacement value and the wholesale value as the correct
standard of valuation, one must first identify the goals of the cram
down valuation process and the strategic results that each valuation
standard creates.3 75 The two most obvious goals of the cram down
valuation process are (1) to enable the debtor to reorganize effec-
tively,376 while (2) allowing future consumers to continue to contract
with creditors to receive consumer goods in the market.37 7 However,
if these were the only goals of the valuation process, their apparently
contradictory nature would mandate conflicting solutions. If the sys-
tem desires to promote effective reorganizations, the best outcome for
the debtor would be to receive the collateral at no cost, thereby free-
ing assets to cover payments to other creditors and increasing the
chances of a successful plan. Yet if the system wants to protect future
debtors who wish to contract for the purchase of consumer goods, it
would make sense to require that the debtor pay the entire value of
374 See Younger, 216 B.R. at 655. By contrast, the Rash case involved an unusually large
disparity between the parties regarding the collateral's valuation. See supra text accompany-
ing notes 227-31.
375 This section posits a rudimentary form of systems analysis. It is based on a para-
digm scholars have developed to analyze the workings of a particular system by first study-
ing the goals of the system, the players within the system, and what strategic activity a
particular solution will encourage among the many players within and without the system.
For more on how systems analysis applies to legal systems, see Lynn M. LoPucki, The Systems
Approach to Law, 82 CORNELL L. Rxv. 479 (1997).
376 See H.R REP. No. 95-595, at 118, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.CAN. 6079 ("[U]se of the
bankruptcy law should be a last resort; [and] that if it is used, debtors should attempt
repayment under chapter 13."); see also In re Frost, 123 B.R. 254, 259 (S.D. Ohio 1990)
("'Congress structured the Bankruptcy Code in a manner that encourages debtors to con-
sider using Chapter 13.'" (quoting In reJourdan, 108 B.R. 1020, 1021-22 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa
1989)); United Nat'l Bank v. Malody (In re Malody), 102 B.R. 745, 749 (B.A.P. 9th Cir.
1989).
377 See Hon. Roger M. Whelan et al., Consumer Bankruptcy Reform: Balancing the Equities
in Chapter 13, 2 AM. BANKR. INsT. L. Rxv. 165, 169 (1994) (discussing Congress's goal of
encouraging secured lending when considering amendments to Chapter 13); cf Brian K.
Van Engen, Nobelman v. American Savings Bank: The Supreme Court's Answer Raises More
Questions, 20 J. CORP. LAW 363, 375-76 (1995) (recognizing that one of the Supreme
Court's goals in Nobelman was to promote consumer lending).
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the loan-not just the value of the collateral.378 Therefore, given the
conflicting nature of these initial goals, the system must define the
goals of valuations more narrowly: The purpose of a cram down valua-
tion is to (1) fix a value and (2) ensure that the fixed value minimizes
the type of strategic activity that wastes the resources of the debtor,
the creditor, and the judicial system.
Courts can minimize strategic activity by adopting a valuation
standard that falls somewhere between the wholesale and replacement
value. If creditors receive what they believe to be the wholesale value
of the collateral or more, they will have received at least the amount
that they would have received outside of bankruptcy.3 7 9 This valua-
tion would not give the creditors an incentive to change their strategy
because the value realized would be equal to or greater than that
which the creditors contracted for in the event of default. Thus, a
valuation between wholesale and replacement minimizes the secured
creditors' strategic activity.380 Furthermore, if debtors can pay what
they believe to be the replacement value of the collateral or less, debt-
ors will not be forced to file Chapter 7 liquidations instead of Chapter
13 reorganizations. 38 1 Debtors will also avoid the transaction costs
necessary to replace collateral vital to the reorganization, which they
could not afford if a court overvalued it. 38 2
However, when a court places a value on collateral that is either
higher than replacement value or lower than wholesale value, strate-
gic activity ensues because of the perceived loss of value from either
the debtor's or the creditor's perspective. When a court sets a value
higher than the replacement value of the collateral, one of two results
occurs: (1) the debtor overpays for retention of the collateral, causing
a loss to the debtor in relation to what he could have saved by secur-
ing the collateral from a cheaper source;38 3 or (2) the debtor must
378 While Congress expressly has prevented secured creditors from requiring repay-
ment of the entire loan through the combined process of claim bifurcation, see supra text
accompanying notes 11-13, and cram down, courts trying to promote the goal of encourag-
ing future lending may choose a standard that would value the collateral at retail value or
higher.
379 This outcome assumes the collateral is a vehicle that may easily be sold through a
wholesale market in vehicles, and that the creditor has access to this market. See In re
Hoskins, 102 F.3d 311, 318 (7th Cir. 1996) (Easterbrook, J., concurring) (describing the
operation of the interdealer wholesale market for used cars).
380 Creditors will inevitably adjust their interest rates to reflect expected returns in the
event of bankruptcy, should courts choose to change the method of valuation. This Note
assumes that today's interest raltes on consumer goods lending reflect, in part, the valua-
tion method courts use in the venue where the creditor believes it may be involved in a
bankruptcy case.
381 See supra text accompanying notes 104-06.
382 See supra text accompanying notes 90-93, 184 (discussing surrender and its effects).
383 For instance, the debtor could have surrendered the collateral to the secured credi-
tor, see supra text accompanying notes 90-93, and purchased identical collateral in the open
market for its replacement price.
1998] 1871
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
surrender the collateral to the creditor, requiring the debtor to incur
transaction costs to replace the collateral and depriving him the use of
the collateral during the period that he is trying to replace it.384 Both
of these outcomes negatively affect the goal of minimizing strategic
activity as well as the larger goal of promoting effective reorganiza-
tions. When a court instead sets the value lower than the wholesale
value of the collateral, the court, in effect, offers the collateral to the
debtor at an amount less than what the creditor expects to receive in
the event of the debtor's default.
The degree of strategic activity that can occur when a court sets
the collateral's value too low warrants further discussion. Setting the
value below wholesale value results in an increase in the debtor's dis-
posable income, which then serves to transfer this value from the se-
cured creditor to the unsecured creditors.385 The debtor likely will
keep the collateral because it will be necessary for an effective reor-
ganization, and the secured creditor, in turn, must engage in strategic
activity to prevent future losses for which he did not contract, even in
the event of default. The debtor also may choose to keep collateral
valued at or below wholesale value because he perceives himself as
getting "a good deal"; even though some authorities argue that value
transferred away from secured creditors will necessarily accrue to un-
secured creditors.3 86 Furthermore, the debtor may (1) anticipate fu-
ture bankruptcy filings, in which the wholesale valuation can strip the
old lien,3 87 (2) shorten the reorganization plan and thereby take the
income from the unsecured creditors,3 88 or (3) think that he can pro-
tect the added income as "reasonably necessary" for his "maintenance
or support."3 89 Strategic solutions for the creditor who has lost the
anticipated default value of the loan include increasing interest rates
on loans for consumer goods, dropping out of an unprofitable lend-
ing market altogether, or initiating other strategies somewhere be-
tween the lawmaking and lending stages.390 Thus, a proper valuation
standard must minimize the risk that bankruptcy courts will value col-
384 See supra text accompanying notes 90-93, 184 (discussing costs of surrender).
385 However, if the debtor's plan pays 100% to unsecured creditors, which is not an
uncommon occurrence, see supra note 53, then the value transfers from the secured credi-
tor directly to the debtor because any money left in the estate after paying the unsecured
creditors in full accrues to the debtor. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325 (1994) (discussing the system
of priority in bankruptcy).
386 See supra notes 103-05 and accompanying text.
387 See LoPucia, supra note 9, at 853-54 (describing methods by which a debtor can
avoid paying the unsecured portion of an undersecured creditor's lien).
388 See Carlson, supra note 211, at 11.
389 11 U.S.C. § 1325 (b) (2) (allowing debtor to retain income that is "reasonably neces-
sary" for these purposes).
390 For an example of the lawmaking strategy of the secured creditor lobby, see supra
text accompanying notes 356-62.
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lateral above its replacement value or below its wholesale value in or-
der to prevent strategic activity and to help the system achieve its
larger goals.
Thus far, proponents of both wholesale and replacement valua-
tion likely remain quite unconvinced of the benefits of a midpoint
standard. They respond to arguments in favor of the midpoint value
by reasoning that neither wholesale valuation nor replacement valua-
tion requires courts to value collateral any lower than wholesale value
or any greater than replacement value, so the aforementioned prob-
lem of encouraging strategic activity does not arise. This response as-
sumes, however, that valuing collateral in a bankruptcy court is an
exact science. In reality, courts that choose, for example, to value ve-
hicles based on one of the Bluebook's values will fail to account for
differences between the hypothetical vehicle valued in the Bluebook
and the actual vehicle valued by the bankruptcy court. If the courts
attempt to use a more fact-specific inquiry into the vehicle's value,
then the valuation will necessitate the consideration of conflicting ex-
pert testimony,391 the creditor's and debtor's own observations,392 and
the judge's own biases and perceptions about the correct value. As
one commentator has pointed out, "it is probably more appropriate to
view the varying bases and manners of valuation as establishing a
range of possible values as opposed to a finite set of alternatives." 393
Adoption of either wholesale valuation or replacement valuation will
cause a greater number of valuation decisions to fall either above
these parameters, when using replacement value, or below these pa-
rameters, when using wholesale value. Both of those situations will
result in strategic activity that skews the purposes and goals of the valu-
ation system. By adopting a standard that looks at the midpoint of
these two values, courts will be less likely to value the collateral at a
point above replacement value or below wholesale value, thereby min-
imizing the likelihood that valuation will create strategic activity by
debtors and creditors.
Given that valuations should avoid fact-specific examinations, 394
and that courts should use a valuation standard that sets the value at
the midpoint of wholesale and replacement value, 395 the final inquiry
concerns whether courts can effectuate these two goals when valuing
391 See, e.g., In reMcElroy, 210 B.R. 833, 835-36 (Bankr. D. Or. 1997); In reRoberts, 210
B.R. 325, 330-31 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1997); In re Byington, 197 B.R. 130, 138 (Bankr. D.
Kan. 1996); Johnson v. General Motors Acceptance Corp. (In reJohnson), 165 B.R. 524,
529 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1994).
392 See, e.g., In re Gates, 214 B.R. 467, 469 (Bankr. D. Md. 1997); In reAngel, 147 B.R.
48, 48-49 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1992).
393 3 COLUER ON BANKRupTcy, supra note 26, § 506.04, at 506-30.
394 See supra Part IV.C.
395 See supra Part IV.B.2.
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collateral in Chapter 13. When valuing vehicles, some post-Rash
courts have chosen to set the value at the midpoint of the retail and
wholesale values, as given in the Bluebook.396 These courts have rec-
ognized that the Bluebook's retail value includes items that the Rash
Court specifically stated, in footnote six, should not be included in
determining replacement value, such as inventory storage and recon-
ditioning costs. 397 The Rash Court maintained that it does not "sug-
gest that a creditor is entitled to recover what it would cost the debtor
to purchase the collateral brand new."3 98 On the other hand, the
Rash Court's willing buyer/willing seller language intimates that the
collateral's value should account for some of the seller's costs and
profit, which will result in a price above the Bluebook's wholesale
value.3 99 Thus, the midpoint of the Bluebook's wholesale and retail
values will yield a value that Rash contemplated. Moreover, using this
method to value the collateral will facilitate an easy calculation, and
will minimize the need for costly valuation hearings because it repre-
sents a compromise upon which parties will often agree.
Courts should adopt the midpoint of retail value and wholesale
value in the Bluebook as the correct method of vehicle valuation in
Chapter 13 cram downs. Adopting this bright-line rule Will reduce
transaction costs to debtors and creditors, will save the courts' time for
other disputes, and will provide an amenable starting point for negoti-
ation. Further this rule will accomplish all of these benefits while ad-
hering to the language of the Rash opinion. Adopting a retail value
standard would ignore Rash's admonitions to avoid conflation of retail
and replacement value400 and would risk the debtor's ability to effec-
tively reorganize. 40 1 Adopting a wholesale value standard would ig-
nore the Rash Court's emphasis on looking at the situation from the
perspective of a willing buyer and willing seller.402 In addition, such a
valuation would encourage strategic behavior by those secured credi-
tors that could increase either the debtor's costs, by trying to recover
attorneys' fees, or the future consumers' costs, by increasing lending
costs or decreasing lending competitiveness. Thus, future courts de-
ciding the proper interpretation of the language of Rash and the ap-
propriate method of valuation in bankruptcy reorganizations should
follow the lead of the Franklin and Younger courts and adopt the mid-
point of retail and wholesale value as the correct valuation standard.
396 See In reYounger, 216 B.1. 649, 655 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1998); In re Franklin, 213
B.R 781, 783 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1997).
397 See, e.g., Younger, 216 B.R. at 656.
398 Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash (In reRash), 117 S. Ct. 1879, 1884 n.2 (1997).
399 See supra text accompanying notes 309-16.
400 See Rash, 117 S. Ct. at 1884 n.2.
401 See supra text accompanying notes 383-84.
402 See Rash. 117 S. Ct. at 1884.
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CONCLUSION
Proponents of wholesale, midpoint, and replacement value stan-
dards disagree over the proper reading of § 506(a). However, these
different schools of thought appear to have forgotten the overall goals
of the system and the incentives that each particular method of valua-
tion creates. Most courts agree that deciding on a single method of
valuation in cram down situations will solve the problem of volumi-
nous litigation. Nevertheless, demonstrating that the Supreme
Court's opinion in Rash does little to promote the process values of
certainty, uniformity, and simplicity, courts after Rash have continued
to adopt divergent methods of valuation.
Because courts should seek a standard that will reduce strategic
activity, which results from valuations above the collateral's actual re-
placement value or below the collateral's actual wholesale value, the
optimal valuation standard for Chapter 13 cram downs is the mid-
point of replacement and wholesale values. However, the difficulty of
calculating the replacement value without a costly fact-specific inquiry
into the makeup of the market available to the debtor requires courts
to adopt a measurement for replacement value that is easily identifi-
able. For vehicle valuations, the best available proxy is the Bluebook
values of the vehicle. Thus, courts should fix the value of vehicles in
Chapter 13 cram downs at the midpoint between the Bluebook whole-
sale and retail values.
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